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“Illegal” Migration Is Speech* 
DANIEL I. MORALES† 
Noncitizens must comply with immigration laws just because citizens say so. The 
citizenry takes for granted its monopoly on immigration control, but the legitimacy 
of this arrangement has been called into question by cutting-edge political theorists. 
One prominent theorist argues, for example, that basic democratic principles require 
that noncitizens living outside the United States have a say in the formation of immi-
gration law since they must obey it. This Article provides a legal response to these 
political theory developments, assimilating them, along with the facts on the ground, 
into an account of “illegal” migration as First Amendment speech.  
If noncitizens’ voices are unjustly excluded from the immigration law conversa-
tion, then “illegal” migration is speech of necessity—there is no other way for 
noncitizens to be heard. Protest speech occurs every time a migrant crosses a border 
without permission and every time a noncitizen chooses to overstay a visa: these 
defiant actions declare the illegitimacy of immigration law. In turn, the individual 
speech acts of millions of “illegal” migrants help to foment an immigrants’ rights 
consciousness and enable groups of migrants to engage in core, protected forms of 
dissent, like marching in the streets shouting “NOT ONE MORE DEPORTATION” 
and tweeting #Not1More.  
By speaking in these disruptive and unorthodox ways, the undocumented force the 
citizenry to grapple with the serious constriction of noncitizens’ lives that immigra-
tion laws cause. If these millions of protesters had respected our immigration laws 
by staying at home, pining for—but failing to seize—a better life in the United States, 
citizens could not know concretely how immigration laws limit noncitizens’ lives, nor 
learn whether our legal and political system is resilient enough to accommodate mil-
lions of people the citizenry did not ask for. Thus, “illegal” migration makes the 
immigration law conversation more consistent with American free-speech values 
than it would otherwise be. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Illegal”1 migration2 is an act that speaks.3 It speaks a dissent from a noncitizen’s 
exclusion from the United States. Because migrating without permission speaks this 
message and lays the groundwork for traditional protest movements—like the 
DREAMers4 (an immigrants’ rights group led by undocumented people brought to 
the United States as children) and #Not1More[Deportation]5 (an organization 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. On nomenclature: I use the term “illegal” migration interchangeably with un-
documented migration throughout. I place “illegal” in quotation marks to reflect my agreement 
with critiques of that label which render ambiguous the state’s right to so label a person who 
migrates without permission. I utilize “illegal,” rather than rely exclusively on undocumented, 
irregular, or unauthorized migration because the speech theory of “illegal” migration offers a 
way for the act of “illegal” migration to fundamentally challenge the state’s legal right to so 
label a person. I also use the term alien, which most scholars have eschewed in favor of 
noncitizen, a term I also use. I use alien to mirror the terminology in immigration statutes and 
as a means of engaging readers who have not already accepted critiques of the sharp legal 
distinctions drawn between aliens and citizens. Alien also carries a connotation of foreignness 
which dovetails with the argument I make about noncitizens’ formal exclusion—alienation 
—from the polity. By using these terms I aim to emphasize the reality that these categories 
exist and have force while critiquing the government’s ability to make good on those 
categories without the consent and voice of aliens themselves. 
 2.  In this paper “illegal” migration refers to the acts of knowingly crossing the border 
without permission, knowingly overstaying visas, or otherwise knowingly seeking to avoid 
immigration authorities in cases where a migrant knows he is deportable.  
 3. See infra Part II (illustrating how the act of migrating without permission can be con-
ceptualized as speech).  
 4. The DREAMers are undocumented people born outside the United States, but raised 
and reared in the United States. See infra Part II.B 
 5. See infra Part II.C (discussing immigrants’ rights movements).  
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demanding the cessation of all deportations)—it is a constructive force.6  
“Illegal” migration is not a simple sign of legal breakdown, this Article argues; it 
is also a mechanism for the formation of a more democratically legitimate immigra-
tion law, law that considers the voices of those subject to it—aliens—not just those 
of the citizens who enforce and author it.7 The persuasive force of undocumented 
migrants’ speech is reflected in President Obama’s executive actions on immigration, 
which have modified immigration enforcement practices to make it easier to remain 
in the United States without permission.8  
This Article is the first to advance a speech theory of “illegal” migration. Unlike 
other arguments that explain why “illegal” migration is more than simply 
lawbreaking,9 the speech theory is grounded in our First Amendment values, focus-
ing attention on the political work of undocumented migration. The First Amendment 
recognizes that American law makes a weak claim to adherence when those subject 
to it lack a voice or vote in its construction.10 By migrating without permission, the 
undocumented protest immigration law’s failure to meet these basic standards of le-
gal legitimacy. This political work is obscured in other accounts; it becomes visible 
by analogy to free speech.  
First Amendment scholar Robert Post has written that our free-speech tradition 
requires “all possible objectives, all possible versions of national identity, be ren-
dered problematic and open to inquiry.”11 By “illegally” migrating, the un-
documented articulate a version of national identity where the citizenry does not 
control who, with peaceful intentions, may enter and remain present within U.S. 
borders. This is an experimental mode of political organization that I call the choose-
yourself model.12 The debate between this model and the orthodox we-choose-you 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. See infra Parts I & II. For an argument illustrating the productive quality of illegal 
action in property law, see Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095, 1095 (2007) (showing how “property” lawbreakers “have enabled 
the reevaluation of, and . . . productive shifts in, the distribution or content of property 
entitlements”).  
 7. See infra Part I.  
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra Part I. Heather Gerken has similarly shown how “illegal” actions—like San 
Francisco’s issuance of invalid marriage licenses—can enhance First Amendment values. See 
Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term – Foreword: Federalism All the Way 
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 42–43 (2010).  
 11. Facilitating and tolerating “illegal” migration renders the prevailing model of auto-
cratic control of membership norms and laws “problematic and open to inquiry.” See Robert 
Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1119 (1993). 
 12. See infra Part II. Choice is a problematic concept in this and other areas. I conceive 
of migration without permission as a choice in a thin sense that acknowledges the structural 
factors that push and pull migrants into the United States. These structural factors predominate 
in the decision calculus of people who migrate “illegally.” Still, choice has some descriptive 
purchase that most theories of “illegal” migration seek to de-emphasize. Though structural 
factors press on all noncitizens, only a minority of aliens subject to such conditions choose to 
migrate without permission. This minimal level of agentic difference between those who stay 
and tolerate poor conditions and those who migrate is what I mean by “choice” in this Article.  
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model13 is sparked and sustained by “illegal” migration. Including the voice of aliens 
in this debate in this flawed way makes immigration law more legitimate because 
doing so gives aliens subject to immigration law a voice in its formulation.14 
 This does not mean, however, that the choose-yourself model should prevail or 
that the deportation power is null.15 “Illegal” migration is speech that contests the 
we-choose-you model. The citizenry can then answer this protest with deportation, 
tolerance, weaker enforcement, amnesty, or some combination of all of these. We 
might pick one or another “answer” precisely because of the persuasive work that 
undocumented migrants have done while present without permission.16 Through this 
sub-ideal democratic process, we constitute the border and renegotiate sovereignty 
over aliens. Thus far, “illegal” migrants have been persuasive. Despite Donald 
Trump’s rise, 65% of Americans currently support a path to citizenship for the un-
documented, a number that has increased from 59% in 2007.17  
Ultimately, this unorthodox discussion may reveal that the United States needs 
some version of the we-choose-you model of membership in order to secure the so-
cial cohesion18 required for it to thrive. But the case is not open and shut. Decades of 
experience incorporating the undocumented into the American social fabric belie the 
necessity of the we-choose-you model. And, more importantly, the citizenry cannot 
know the necessity of the we-choose-you model19 on the First Amendment’s own 
terms—through robust debate and dialogue—without providing some mechanism 
through which aliens can register their views on immigration laws. Under current 
conditions, where aliens have no formal voice or vote in immigration law, “illegal” 
migration and presence is the sub-ideal way that aliens make their voices heard in 
this debate.20 If we ever “open the floodgates” and effectively abolish immigration 
law, as Kevin Johnson has advocated,21 it will be in part because of the persuasive 
speech of “illegal” migrants. 
The speech theory breaks new ground. Classic theories of undocumented migra-
tion and amnesty emphasize forgiving or forgetting the immigrant’s transgression 
but do not undermine a migrant’s illegality or the state’s right to exclude.22 Newer 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. The notion that the United States had open borders for most of its history and that the 
passage of the quota acts in the 1920s was a stark break from that tradition is largely a myth. 
Aristide Goldberg has shown that the some combination of federal, local and state government 
policies have actively regulated immigration from the colonial period to the present. See 
generally ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE FASHION-
ING OF AMERICA (2006).  
 14. See infra Part I. 
 15. But see infra notes 72–73 (discussing open borders).  
 16. See infra Part II.E.  
 17. See Jeffrey M. Jones, 65% Favor Path to Citizenship for Illegal Immigrants, GALLUP 
(Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/184577/favor-path-citizenship-illegal-immigrants.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/BZ6G-4QC5]. 
 18. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 92 (2014) (urging that the 
we-choose-you model is necessary to secure national social cohesion and internal equality).  
 19. See infra Part I.D. 
 20. See infra Part I.D.  
 21. See generally KEVIN JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO 
RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS (2009). 
 22. Legal scholar Linda Bosniak has grouped theories of undocumented migration and 
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theories problematize the illegality of undocumented migrants but accept the legiti-
macy or desirability of the we-choose-you model. Legal scholar Hiroshi Motomura, 
for example, argues that the deliberate underenforcement of immigration law for 
many decades created an implied contract between “illegal” migrants and the United 
States that requires migrants’ legalization.23 No such obligation would have arisen, 
on Motomura’s theory, had the United States robustly enforced immigration law all 
along. In this way, Motomura, like many other legal theorists, finds no inherent legal 
problem with the we-choose-you model and does not illustrate how undocumented 
migrants contest that model and change it.24  
The speech theory closes these gaps in our understanding. By showing how un-
documented migration can be understood as legitimate protest speech, the speech 
theory articulates a legal problem with the we-choose-you model (no alien voice or 
vote in immigration law formation) and offers a new way to undermine the illegality 
of undocumented migration (“illegal” migrant protestors are not simply lawbreakers).  
The speech theory also challenges immigration law scholars to look at “illegal” 
migration as a productive force—not just a pathology. This perspective is novel. The 
legal scholarship tends to portray “illegal” migration as any other legal problem, as 
                                                                                                                 
 
amnesty into those that “forgive” or “forget.” She opposes these theories to newer “vindica-
tory” theories which would acknowledge in some way that undocumented migrants were in 
the right by migrating. Forgiving and forgetting both seek to wipe the slate clean, re-
instantiating border regulation from a position of zero error. They erase the regulatory mis-
takes of the past by incorporating the current undocumented population into the body politic, 
or the legal alien population, and then perfecting immigration regulation for the future so that 
an undocumented population does not reemerge. See Linda Bosniak, Amnesty in Immigration: 
Forgetting, Forgiving, Freedom, 16 CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 344, 361, 363–64 
(2013) (citing and discussing AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND 
GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2009); MICHAEL M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF 
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); Hiroshi Motomura, What Is “Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform”? Taking the Long View, 63 ARK. L. REV. 225 (2010); Ayelet Shachar, Earned 
Citizenship: Property Lessons for Immigration Reform, 23 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 110 (2011) 
[hereinafter Shachar Property Lessons]).  
By contrast, a vindicatory theory of “illegal” migration and amnesty would flow from: 
(1) the state’s forfeiture of sovereign rights to exclude—through, say, open tolerance of the 
undocumented, (2) the fact that the state benefits from a migrant’s toil in the receiving country, 
(3) a kind of reparations framework that views liberalized migration as a substitute for cash 
compensation for colonialist wrongs, and (4) “the receiving state’s role in producing calami-
tous political or economic consequences abroad which propelled portions of the sending 
state’s population to depart.” Id. at 359–61 (citing the theories of scholars Hiroshi Motomura, 
Michael Walzer, and Rogers Smith, and of activist Alex Franco); see also MOTOMURA, supra 
note 18 (refining theory of undocumented migration and amnesty as contract) (reviewed in 
Stephen Lee, Book Reviews: Growing Up Outside the Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1405 (2015)); 
Hiroshi Motomura, Who Belongs?: Immigration Outside the Law and the Idea of Americans 
in Waiting, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 359 (2012).  
The speech theory of “illegal” migration is a vindicatory theory that adds to existing theo-
ries by emphasizing the constructive, norm-generating work of “illegal” migration, and by 
grounding the right to migrate outside the law in the free-speech flaw in immigration law, 
rather than in any action or inaction by the state. See infra Part I.  
 23. See MOTOMURA, supra note 18 at 106–07. 
 24. See id. 
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something to be solved and eliminated through rational legal reform,25 a symptom of 
imperfect regulation that ought to be fixed.26 But this frame leaves out the persuasive 
work of undocumented migration, the way it has forced positive revisions in our 
thinking about membership in the United States.27 Absent those who migrate without 
permission, scholars and citizens would not have discussed the foundational flaws in 
our immigration laws or our conception of sovereignty over aliens. We would never 
have invented ways of earning citizenship,28 formulated tolerance of undocumented 
migration as an implied contract,29 or thought hard about how our immigration laws 
constrict the life chances of millions of people outside our borders.30 Nor would the 
Supreme Court have extended equal protection rights to undocumented children.31 
Undocumented migrants have forced the global implications of our national immi-
gration policies onto the legal and political agenda. The speech theory accounts for 
this constructive work and contemplates the normative development that we would 
lose in an immigration system that remained restrictively governed by citizens, but 
with perfect enforcement and due process—a system that erases the “illegal” migrant.  
This point about erasure is more important than ever. As Donald Trump taps latent 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. For a general argument against the tendency of legal scholarship to offer solutions 
rather than a thorough understanding of the context of any given legal problem, see Paul W. 
Kahn, Freedom, Autonomy, and the Cultural Study of Law, 13 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 141 (2001).  
 26. David Martin’s work is emblematic of the broader scholarly faith in the perfectibility 
of immigration law administration. See, e.g., David A. Martin, Eight Myths About Immigration 
Enforcement, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 525 (2007). Recent experience with compre-
hensive immigration reform undermines the notion, expressed by Martin and others, that better 
enforcement will lead to an expanded visa supply and more total immigration. The 2013 bill 
that came closest to cashing out the traditional immigration reform model—with more low-
wage visas, more border enforcement, and amnesty for those undocumented already present 
—was projected to lower total future immigration (legal and “illegal”) when compared to the 
status quo. See Matthew Yglesias, Obama Is Finally Making the Case for Immigration, Not 
Just “Immigration Reform,” VOX (Nov. 21, 2014 11:00 AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/11 
/21/7257643/case-for-immigration [https://web.archive.org/web/20160423013951/http://www 
.vox.com/2014/11/21/7257643/case-for-immigration] (citing RELEASE: CAP Releases 
Current and Estimated Future Immigration Numbers Based on S. 744, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS (May 2, 2013), https://www.americanprogress.org/press/release/2013/05/02/61935 
/release-cap-releases-current-and-estimated-future-immigration-numbers-based-on-s-744/ [https:// 
perma.cc/D6AQ-3GLL]). 
 27. See MOTOMURA, supra note 18, at 172–208 (discussing legalization of “illegal” mi-
grants and the addition of a guest worker program as long-term solutions to undocumented 
migration). But see Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of 
Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 813–14 (2007) (arguing that “illegal” migration cou-
pled with deportation of those convicted of crimes is a more efficient system for facilitating 
migration of low-skill workers than a visa system that selects persons ex ante); cf. Judith 
Resnik, Bordering by Law: The Migration of Law, Crimes, Sovereignty, and the Mail, in 
NOMOS: IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION (Jack Knight ed., 2015) (urging that global agree-
ments to facilitate free movement of mail offers a cooperative international model for de-
criminalizing migration and facilitating free movement of persons). 
 28. See Shachar Property Lessons, supra note 22, at 121–22. 
 29. See MOTOMURA, supra note 18, at 105–12.  
 30. See infra Part I.B.  
 31. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 209 (1982).  
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anti-immigrant animus, it is easy to think that citizens and aliens would all be better 
off if “illegal” migration would simply disappear. And perhaps the citizenry, and its 
chosen few noncitizens, would be better off if “illegal” migration were eradicated. 
But perfect administration would surely deny many millions of people access to the 
transformative power of life in the United States. The citizenry’s monopoly on im-
migration control means that legal visas are likely to remain under-supplied relative 
to demand from aliens. The last Senate-passed comprehensive immigration reform 
bill illustrates this problem: it would have significantly lowered total immigration to 
the U.S.—legal plus “illegal”—because its stepped-up enforcement measures would 
have reduced “illegal” migration by far more than the visa supply expanded.32 Under 
these political conditions preserving a space for “illegal” migration is essential for 
those who think the material welfare and horizon of opportunity of all human beings 
are of equal moral concern. 
For citizens and citizen scholars, the speech theory acknowledges the validity of 
their doubts about the feasibility or desirability of open borders while pushing them 
to grapple with the fundamental injustice of making laws that apply to aliens without 
their input. It encourages citizens not to “forgive and forget”33 undocumented 
migrants’ trespass of U.S. borders, but to question our power to make those laws for 
aliens and aliens’ duty to obey them; to see that aliens might have the right to trespass 
our immigration laws because such laws significantly narrow their life chances and 
were made without their input. 
 The speech theory also helps citizens see what they gain from the speech of the 
undocumented: the opportunity to witness how our political community can success-
fully accommodate people who we did not expressly want or ask for, and how our 
understanding of sovereign power over aliens can evolve to embrace those who 
breached that power. We would not be able to assimilate concrete evidence of our 
social, legal, and political adaptability if aliens had not violated our immigration laws 
and asked to become members nonetheless. Embracing this kind of evolution 
—giving a voice to aliens—can help to place the United States at the vanguard of 
democratic politics.  
For aliens, the speech theory offers agency, moral authority, and recognition of 
their contribution to American democratic legal development. The broken families, 
the stress of living in the shadows, and the risk of death in crossing a border—all of 
that suffering was not just an effort to enhance the material welfare of migrants’ 
families; it was also to protest the injustice and arbitrariness of how birthplace fixes 
one’s life chances. The undocumented chose themselves to join the American com-
munity rather than allow the happenstance of birthplace to shape their destinies and 
those of their children forever. They were not just pushed and pulled by economic 
and geopolitical forces out of their control; they were not just exploited by employers 
who want their labor with no strings attached. The undocumented also have fought 
these forces in an effort to take control of their own futures. For that they deserve 
credit. The speech theory, unlike others, acknowledges and celebrates these facts.  
I develop the argument in three parts. In Part I, I describe what I call the free-
speech flaw in immigration law: the exceptional fact that immigration law is made 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. See Yglesias, supra note 26.  
 33. See Bosniak, supra note 22, at 347–48.  
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by citizens to apply solely to aliens. Using First Amendment theory and the philoso-
phy of Jürgen Habermas, I argue that “illegal” migration as practiced in the United 
States is a form of sub-ideal political speech. In Part II, I show how “illegal” migra-
tion is speech in a way that is similar to how actions of the civil, gay, and women’s 
rights movements were speech. Specifically, I show how the subordination of those 
groups of citizens required initial illegal actions in order ultimately to conduct a po-
litical dialogue that sounds more like the traditional core of protected First Amend-
ment political speech. Because the Supreme Court vindicated some such actions as 
speech, I argue that the act of “illegally” migrating can be similarly conceptualized. 
In Part III, I analyze President Obama’s recent executive actions and suggest that 
they show that “illegal” migration has persuasive power. Both the fact that Obama 
took significant political and legal34 risk35 for a controversial group of nonvoters, and 
that many of those actions make it easier to live as an undocumented person, show 
that “illegal” migration has a persuasive force similar to traditional forms of rational 
argument.  
Theories are critical to legal and social change because they light the way forward. 
I offer my speech theory of “illegal” migration as a supplement to other accounts. I 
hope that the speech theory, even if in error, sparks new discussions and ways of 
thinking that help to move immigration law in the direction of justice.  
I. THE FREE-SPEECH FLAW IN IMMIGRATION LAW 
Immigration law is exceptional in so many ways,36 and here is another one: aliens 
lack a formal voice or vote in immigration law, even though such laws apply only to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (enjoining the 
Department of Homeland Security from granting a temporary reprieve from deportation to 
millions of undocumented migrants), aff’d 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d 136 S. Ct. 2271 
(2016). Though an equally divided Supreme Court left in place an injunction staying Obama’s 
executive relief for some undocumented, the defined enforcement criteria discussed in Part 
II.D, infra, will stand, as they went unchallenged. Id. Moreover, my claim that undocumented 
migration has had persuasive force still holds. This ruling, which forecloses expanded deferred 
action, is a blow to migrants, but it will not silence them; instead the decision will move the 
conversation onto a different institutional stage. States and localities, for instance, now appear 
ready to lead the fight to protect the undocumented. 
 35. See infra Part III. See generally President Obama’s Unilateral Action on Immigration 
Has No Precedent, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions 
/president-obamas-unilateral-action-on-immigration-has-no-precedent/2014/12/03/3fd78650-79a3 
-11e4-9a27-6fdbc612bff8_story.html [https://perma.cc/J9X8-H6QU].  
 36. Where immigration law is concerned, “the normal rules of constitutional law simply 
do not apply.” STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND 
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 113 (5th ed. 2009). The modern federal immigration power is con-
stitutionally exceptional in two distinct but interrelated aspects. First, the authority to regulate 
immigration derives not from any enumerated power, but it is rather “an incident of sover-
eignty belonging to the government of the United States.” Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 
130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). “Second, the federal government’s adoption and enforcement of 
immigration laws is buffered against judicially enforceable constitutional constraints.” 
Matthew J. Lindsay, Disaggregating “Immigration Law,” 68 FLA. L. REV. 178, 187 (2016). 
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them and not to the citizens who pass them.37 Yet, law in a democracy earns our 
fidelity by our having had a voice and vote—a free-speech say—in its articulation.38 
Under these conditions of formal exclusion from our borders and from the debate 
about our borders, “illegal” migration becomes the only means by which aliens can 
gain an effective voice, if not a vote, in the formation of immigration law. “Illegal” 
migration forces the democratic community to debate the boundary of that commu-
nity in a more robust, more inclusive way—in a way that begins to approximate the 
way that it debates any other law.39 This sort of contestation cannot adequately occur 
where only citizens speak in the immigration debate to other citizens: aliens must 
speak for themselves too.40  
                                                                                                                 
 
The Congressional powers to exclude and to deport aliens have been held to be 
‘plenary’. . . . ‘Over no conceivable subject,’ the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
said, ‘is the legislative power of Congress more complete.’ When regulating im-
migration, Congress may discriminate on the basis of race. It may discriminate 
on the bases of gender and legitimacy. It may restrict aliens’ political speech 
without having to establish a clear and present danger. With some qualifications, 
Congress may disregard procedural due process when excluding aliens. 
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN 
BRITAIN AND AMERICA 178 (1987); see also Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary 
Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 926 (1995). 
The discretion that the executive branch and the immigration agency may exercise over aliens 
and in the enforcement of immigration has also been exceptional. See generally Adam B. Cox 
& Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009); 
Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 961 (1998).  
 37. See Arash Abizadeh, Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right To 
Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders, 36 POL. THEORY 37, 41 (2008). Abizadeh argues that 
the border control laws of existing democratic societies, including immigration laws, are ille-
gitimate because they are not democratically constituted by the aliens subject to them. Immi-
gration law could legitimately bind aliens if, under stringent conditions of democratic partici-
pation, aliens democratically authorize the borders they are subject to. Absent this democratic 
consent, the democratic state acts illegitimately when it enforces sovereignty against aliens 
who have not democratically consented to it. Abizadeh’s is an ideal theory; a pantomime of 
alien approval will not do. For borders to be democratically legitimate, all persons subject to 
the border regime “must have the opportunity . . . actually to participate in the political pro-
cesses that determine how power is exercised, on terms that . . . are consistent with their free-
dom and equality.” Id.  
 38. See infra Part I.A. 
 39. “[T]here is ‘practically universal agreement’” that one “core norm” of the First 
Amendment “is democracy.” James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value 
of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 497 n.37, 498 (2011) (“[T]here is 
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free 
discussion of governmental affairs.”) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).  
 40. It is difficult for oppressed people to speak to power and be heard through asymmetric 
power relations, as a number of theoretical literatures relate. Feminist legal theorist Catherine 
MacKinnon famously argued that pornography silences women in a way that violates free 
speech. See CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 
193 (1987); see also Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
293, 294–98 (1993) (using J.L. Austin’s speech act theory to describe how the subordinated 
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Aliens speak when they migrate in violation of the law41 and then advocate for 
their legal inclusion nonetheless. By speaking the illegitimacy of their unconsented 
exclusion from our borders, the undocumented provide citizens with the opportunity 
to discuss and overcome one of the last remaining tensions in our democracy: the 
regulation of membership in democratic government by undemocratic means.42 
Ironically, then, the protest speech of “illegal” migration, and the United States’ rela-
tive tolerance for it,43 make immigration law more legitimate by—quite imper-
fectly—filling in this gap in voice. 
                                                                                                                 
 
can be silenced by structural conditions—including pornography—which prevent the em-
powered listener from comprehending the subordinated speaker’s intended meaning). The 
postcolonial literature and legal scholarship building on it, offer similar accounts focused on 
the silencing that occurs in the postcolonial relationship, where overlapping power differen-
tials (empire, race, gender) radically constrict the means of communication for subjugated 
persons. See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1411 (2003) (citing 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETA-
TION OF CULTURE 271, 296–97 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988) (asking 
whether the subordinated can effectively communicate in the face of multiple layers of 
distorting power)); see generally EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1979). Still, the oppressed 
do manage to find ways to be heard, and some legal scholars and political scientists have 
focused on documenting the strategies that enable subordinated groups to speak through power 
and resist it. See generally JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF 
PEASANT RESISTANCE 29–31 (1985) (theorizing strategies like “foot dragging, dissimulation, 
false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, [and] sabotage” as “weapons of 
the weak”: the means by which oppressed people resist power, as well as cultivate and 
maintain an oppositional consciousness.); James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 
106 YALE L.J. 941, 953 (1997) (“Disruptive noncompliance is the quintessential form of 
subordinated group power. Lacking the informational, organizational, and financial resources 
to compete with elites in the representative political process, subordinate groups exercise 
direct power by withholding cooperation from existing institutions.”); see also PAULO FREIRE, 
PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (Myra Bergman Ramos, trans., 1970) (emphasizing the agency 
of subordinated groups to contest power structures); JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE 
ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS (1990).  
 41. See infra Part I.A–I.B and Part II for discussion of how the act of migrating without 
permission can be conceptualized as speech. See also JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A 
POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 24–25, 43–44 (1997) (describing J.L. Austin’s Speech Act 
theory, which describes and taxonomizes the communicative content of actions). 
 42. As the first nation-state to adopt a theory and practice of sovereignty grounded in the 
anarchic, collective of “the People,” the United States has unique cultural and legal resources 
with which to ask the question of who ought to decide who the People should be. America, as 
our revolutionary history and the discussion infra Parts II and III show, is fertile ground for 
the contestation of sovereignty norms. Our national interest in embracing rather than resisting 
that fertility is political evolution. See Daniel I. Morales, Undocumented Migrants as New 
(and Peaceful) American Revolutionaries, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 135 (2016) 
(describing the radical social strains that motivated American revolutionaries and analogizing 
them to the circumstances and position of the undocumented).  
 43. For discussion of tolerance of undocumented migration see MOTOMURA, supra note 
18, at 86–112.  
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A. Legal Legitimacy and Free Speech  
Free speech and democracy go hand-in-hand; their bond is so strong that we think 
a democracy without free speech scarcely a democracy at all. In the United States 
“[t]he free speech clause of the First Amendment has become the ground-norm of 
the entire constitutional edifice. So much so that there are arguments that it is beyond 
the possibility of amendment.”44 Put another way, the operation of free speech is a 
de facto predicate to legal legitimacy in our constitutional system. A law adopted in 
the absence of free speech would have a lesser claim to our adherence—or perhaps 
none at all—even where it was otherwise passed following constitutional procedures 
(bicameralism, presentment, etc.).45  
This domestic tie between legal legitimacy and free speech strongly resonates 
with the legal theory of Jürgen Habermas. For Habermas, law is legitimate where it 
is the product of the “unforced force of the better argument.”46 The ideal aspiration 
of his theory is to have democratic deliberation—a very strong, egalitarian form of 
free political speech47—produce binding law, so that coercion is grounded in reasons 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. See PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 150 (2011) (citation omitted).  
 45. The claim is not that immigration law is not law in the positivist sense because it lacks 
democratic authorization. See SCOTT J. SCHAPIRO, LEGALITY 1–35 (2011) (discussing the defi-
nition of legal positivism). Rather, my claim is that immigration law makes a weaker claim to 
obedience—it is less legitimate—than other categories of United States law because it is in 
serious tension with free-speech norms. I base this claim in part on a sociological observation 
that most American citizens would agree that laws passed in liberal democratic societies with 
robust free-speech rights have stronger claims to legitimacy than laws passed where those 
rights did not obtain. See KAHN, supra note 44, at 148. These same citizens make an exception 
for immigration law. Aliens are expected to obey immigration laws despite their being denied 
a free-speech say in their formation. Following Abizadeh, this exception is indefensible for a 
democracy. See Abizadeh, supra note 37. It is particularly indefensible in the United States 
context given the revolutionary history of our democracy and the special place of immigration 
in the socio-historical fabric. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  
 46. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 306 (Williams Rehg trans., MIT Press, 1998) (1992)  
[hereinafter BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS]. This ideal formulation of the procedural predicate 
to legitimate democratic law has influenced legal scholars in a variety of ways. See Oren 
Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability 
in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1171 (2008) (using Habermas’s ideal to bol-
ster claim that search engine manipulation is wrong); A. Michael Froomkin, 
Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 
752 (2003) (arguing that the rulemaking procedures of the Internet Engineering Task Force 
meet “Habermas’s notoriously demanding procedural conditions for a discourse capable of 
legitimating its outcomes”); Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of 
Community, 90 MICH. L. REV. 685, 686 n.6 (1992) (using Habermas to unpack legal scholars’ 
use of “communitarian values”); Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political 
Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 647 (2008) (describing the 
applicability of Habermas’s ideal conditions for free speech to campaign finance law).  
 47. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE 
ETHICS 163–64 (Ciaran Cronin trans., MIT Press, 1993) (1991) (specifying that the set of 
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that all affected persons could accept. The result is law that we respect because it has 
been rationally formulated with our input and in our interest, not because the sword 
of Damocles hangs over us or our basic economic security48 depends on our adher-
ence to law’s commands.49  
Habermas’s theory of legal legitimacy was applied systematically to First Amend-
ment doctrine by American legal theorist Lawrence Solum.50 Solum claimed that the 
speech-legitimacy tie fits critical aspects of First Amendment doctrine and “provides 
a coherent justification for the freedom of speech,”51 indeed, a more coherent justifi-
cation and a better fit than other possibilities.52 Advocacy of violent revolution, to 
take one important example, is permissible under the First Amendment per Solum 
because the government’s claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use of violent force 
must itself be justified through open dialogue with the people subject to it. The only 
way to challenge this monopoly on violence is through “implicit justification or ex-
plicit advocacy of illegal action, either of nonviolent civil disobedience or of violent 
revolution.”53 “Such fundamental challenges must be allowed” in order to maintain 
that our government’s monopoly on violence is legitimate.54 “If government does not 
allow discourse which challenges its legitimacy [in this way] . . . [s]ocial consensus 
on government legitimacy might be maintained through force,” but that force would 
remain illegitimate for repressing speech with the sword.55 In this way, the right to 
robust—even radical—dissent that could produce actual violence fortifies law’s 
claim to our fidelity.  
The legitimating work of speech might seem superficial from this telling; if we 
let people say what they want, then laws are legitimate. In fact, Habermas has ad-
vanced stringent criteria that attend an “ideal speech situation”56 where law is most 
fully legitimate. These criteria include the substantive, social, and legal equality of 
discussants and deliberative democratic procedures designed to ensure that all per-
spectives are heard.57 These background assumptions ensure that the “unforced force 
of the better argument” actually prevails in law, rather than unspoken power 
differentials.  
                                                                                                                 
 
procedural conditions for the formation of perfectly legitimate law set in the “ideal speech 
situation” is aspirational).  
 48. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 46, at 122–24 (discussing how the 
guarantee of basic social welfare to participants may be required for debates to produce 
legitimate agreements); id. at 103, 266 (discussing the all-affected principle).  
 49. See Froomkin, supra note 46, at 761–64 (discussing “Hobbesian predators” as an 
oppositional threat to ideal Habermasian debate).  
 50. See Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First 
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 119–22 (1989).  
 51. Id. at 55.  
 52. Id. at 68–85.  
 53. Id. at 122.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.   
 56. Id. at 96–99 (discussing the procedural characteristics of the ideal speech situation).  
 57. For society to come to collective agreements that are legitimate, persons subject to the 
decision must be granted certain “basic rights that citizens must mutually grant one another if 
they want to legitimately regulate their life in common . . . .” BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, 
supra note 46, at 118.  
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Of course, we are never in the “ideal speech situation.”58 As with aspirational 
constitutional norms, we are always working from below looking up. From this van-
tage point, the tie between speech and suffrage elaborated by canonical First Amend-
ment theorist Alexander Meiklejohn is quite useful. Free speech, politics, and legiti-
mate lawmaking are intertwined for Meiklejohn because “public issues shall be 
decided by universal suffrage.”59 Speech has persuasive force—the “unforced force 
of the better argument”—in the context of its relationship to the ballot.60 The New 
England town hall meeting is Meiklejohn’s “ideal speech situation”; in it, robust, 
decorous discussion combines with the vote to form legitimate law.61  
But, writing in 1948, Meiklejohn recognized the dramatic extent to which his 
town-hall ideal did not obtain. He called that pre-civil-rights-movement reality “alien 
government” and described it as follows:  
Governments, we insist, derive their just powers from the consent of the 
governed. If that consent be lacking, governments have no just 
powers. . . . [T]o an unforgivable degree, citizens of the United States are 
still subjected to decisions in the making of which they have had no ef-
fective share. So far as this is true, we are not self-governed; we are not 
politically free. We are governed by others. And perhaps worse, we are, 
without their consent, the governors of others. . . . Alien government . . . 
[is w]hen one man or some self-chosen group holds control, without con-
sent, over others, the relation between them is one of force and counter-
force, of compulsion on the one hand and submission or resistance on the 
other.62  
At the time, and still today,63 African Americans and other marginalized groups were 
subject to “alien government.”  
                                                                                                                 
 
 58. Between Facts and Norms and The Theory of Communicative Action have relaxed the 
procedural and substantive criteria to form legitimate law. See Froomkin, supra note 46, at 
767–68. 
 59. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 27 
(1948). 
 60. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 46, at 306. Free speech and politics are in-
tertwined, flowing from the basic democratic principle that “public issues shall be decided by 
universal suffrage;” speech has force precisely because of that relationship. MEIKLEJOHN, 
supra note 59, at 27. The reverse holds true too: the free speech of aliens is less efficacious for 
having no direct relationship to electoral power. 
 61. See HABERMAS, supra note 47, at 163–64. Of course, these are not Meiklejohn’s 
terms, but they fit key aspects of his theory of the First Amendment. I draw connections be-
tween Habermas, Solum, and Meiklejohn in an effort to strengthen the tie between free speech 
and legitimate lawmaking for an audience of lawyers. Illustrating how domestic free-speech 
thinkers dovetail with Habermas’s universal theory, I aim to particularize some of Habermas’s 
claims to the American context.  
 62. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 59, at 3–5 (emphasis added).  
 63. The numerous incidents of violence against African Americans at the hands of the 
state, most recently publicized by the #BlackLivesMatter movement, are among the most 
prominent ways in which African Americans are denied their “effective share” in self-
governance. See BLACK LIVES MATTER, blacklivesmatter.com [https://perma.cc/MRA6-PVZ6]; 
see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
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To be sure, even then, such groups had a token or symbolic “share” in governance: 
in 1948 some African Americans did stand and speak on the soapbox and, to an even 
more limited degree, at the ballot box. But their share in self-governance was not 
“effective.” Government was “alien” to African Americans because, though citizens 
properly entitled to full rights of self-governance, they stood in the position of 
aliens—political outsiders ruled by force and compulsion—when they were denied 
their “effective share” in self-governance.  
If free speech is the New England town hall meeting, African Americans and other 
subordinated citizens living under alien government are unheard because they are 
kept out of the hall; they are denied voice and the vote, just like the aliens immigra-
tion law excludes from the political community. 
B. Immigration Law as Alien Government, or Rule sans Voice and Vote 
What of the alien who wishes to migrate but is excluded? He is always living 
under alien government, yet we barely notice. How can we maintain that aliens must 
respect laws in which they have had no “effective share”?  
Immigration law is made in opposition to the town hall or the “ideal speech situ-
ation.” It is made, self-consciously, “in the shadow of force.”64 Constitutional immi-
gration and citizenship law is profoundly comfortable with granting Congress—and 
to a lesser extent, the executive—unfettered power to admit and deport aliens on 
whatever substantive grounds they wish65 and absent the suffrage and free speech 
predicates that legitimate other laws.66 Yet the Constitution does not mandate this 
exceptional authority. The constitutional plenary authority doctrine, and all of the 
immigration law doctrines made in its shadow, were found by the Supreme Court to 
be implied in a nineteenth-century theory of sovereignty.67 That theory was 
                                                                                                                 
 
COLORBLINDNESS (2010); Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite: Police Terror of 
Minority Communities, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 57, 57–69 (2014). The historical and ongoing 
economic violence done to black communities strongly suggests that the United States lacks 
the conditions of substantive equality required for just lawmaking under a Habermasian theory 
of legitimacy. See, e.g., Ta-Nehisi Coats, The Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC (June 
2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2014/05/the-case-for-reparations/361631/ 
[https://perma.cc/LRE9-AGD8] (describing the systemic and continuing destruction of black 
wealth by the United States government).  
 64. KAHN, supra note 44, at 136. 
 65. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
 66. We formulate immigration law without any formal voice for those it applies to. Aliens 
do not vote in our elections, even if they live with our permission within our borders. And 
aliens not present within our borders, but who wish to migrate yet are excluded, are also denied 
a voice in the formulation of the rules that govern who may enter or be excluded from the 
United States. See generally Abizadeh, supra note 37.  
 67. “[T]he authority to regulate immigration does not derive from any enumerated power, 
but is rather ‘an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States.’” 
Lindsay, supra note 36, at 187 (quoting Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 
(1889)). T. Alexander Aleinikoff and David Martin have argued that: 
 (a) The overall constitutional structure reveals an intent to place the federal 
government of the United States on an equal footing with the central govern-
ments of other nations, and the latter have the power to exclude noncitizens; and 
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grounded, in turn, in monarchical, pre-democratic thought.68  
Yet this exceptional state is utterly natural to us. To understand just how natural, 
consider that American political philosopher John Rawls validated the status quo on 
immigration exclusion69 even though he used the arbitrariness of one’s material cir-
cumstances at birth as the pivot point for his entire egalitarian political theory.70 Is 
not the accident of citizenship as arbitrary a material endowment as being born a 
Rockefeller71—a problem for social justice that Rawls did take seriously? Indeed, 
                                                                                                                 
 
(b) The framers must have intended to authorize the federal government to define 
who we are as a people. 
 LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 36, at 125 (citing T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID 
A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS & POLICY 16–18 (1st ed. 1985)).  
Michael Scaperlanda has shown the historical contingency of the theory of sovereignty that 
plenary authority continues to nourish to this day:  
Plenary power developed in this era of “absolute” sovereignty, when no global 
legal infrastructure existed to harness the power of an individual nation-state 
within its own domain. Additionally, although the international legal framework 
ordered relations among independent sovereigns, it lacked concern for the status 
of individual human beings. Persons were objects, not subjects, in the interna-
tional arena; they lacked rights and duties. This picture informed the Court’s view 
of the constitutional rights of noncitizens, and it still informs the Court’s view 
today. This snapshot is but a single frame in a much larger international drama 
that continues to unfold. The Court’s plenary power cases, however, continue to 
cling to the faded still photography of last century, failing to acknowledge sov-
ereignty’s motion, including drastic changes in international human rights law in 
our century. 
Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965, 970–71 
(1993) (emphasis omitted). 
 68. Allison Brownell Tirres notes how the plenary authority doctrine is “cast as pre-
modern, a throwback to sovereignty in a time of monarchy, not democracy, when constitutions 
could not, or did not, fully control sovereign prerogative.” Allison Brownell Tirres, Mercy in 
Immigration Law, 2013 BYU. L. REV. 1563, 1602 (2013). Criminal law theorist Markus 
Dubber has noted a similar tension in the American criminal law, arguing that the United 
States has retained a monarchical criminal law that has not been reconstituted in light of demo-
cratic political theory. See Markus D. Dubber, The State as Victim: Treason and the Paradox 
of American Criminal Law 5, 7–8 (Dec. 21, 2009) (unpublished manuscript).  
 69. Rawls defines the “liberal peoples” that make societies behind the veil of ignorance 
as those who share a hereditary lineage. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 23 (2d ed. 
1999) [hereinafter THE LAW OF PEOPLES].  
 70. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1999); Leif Wenar, John 
Rawls: Two Guiding Ideas of Justice as Fairness, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Sept. 24, 
2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/#TwoGuiIdeJusFai [https://perma.cc/SJR3-BVBN]. 
 71. The income of the average migrant increases an average of 125%, or about $10,798, 
by moving to the more productive nations of the developed world. See John Kennan, Open 
Borders, 16 REV. ECON. DYNAMICS L1, L11 (2013) (all estimates are in 2012 dollars and ad-
justed for purchasing power); see also LANT PRITCHETT, LET THEIR PEOPLE COME: BREAKING 
THE GRIDLOCK ON INTERNATIONAL LABOR MOBILITY 33 (2006).  
The wealthy nations not only offer migrants more hard cash, but a litany of institutions and 
other collective investments—education, health care, clean water, plumbing—that materially 
increase well-being, but are not captured in migrants’ paychecks. If, following Rawls, what 
we really care about is potential for self-actualization, then among nearly all indicia that human 
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before Rawls took this position on immigration law, Joseph Carens, in perhaps the 
most cited article ever written on citizenship and nationality, extrapolated from 
Rawls’s premises in his early work that “the right to migrate” was as essential to 
Rawls’s theory as any other right owed to all persons in a just Rawlsian state.72  
Rawls’s ultimate, relatively uncritical73 refusal74 to include liberalized immi-
gration in his theory of the just state reflects the profound degree to which exclusive 
control of entry and exit by sovereigns—democratic or not—has been naturalized.75 
Nearly every reader will share Rawls’s intuition that nations need exclusive control 
over entry and exit of persons, and that laws which effect this power are exempt from 
the normal legitimacy predicates operative in a democratic state. We think alien gov-
ernment is just fine—for aliens.  
C. Legitimating Alien Government with “Illegal” Migration  
Just because alien government for aliens standing at the border is natural, does 
not mean it is right.76 Solum saw part of the constitutional problem with requiring 
                                                                                                                 
 
beings care about, migration extends the horizon of possibility for migrants in dramatic fash-
ion. See Wenar, supra note 70. 
 72. Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. POL. 251, 
258 (1987).  
 73. Political theorist Jacqueline Stevens criticized Rawls for adopting without analysis 
John Stuart Mill’s view that to “exist as a political community, people need to have the ‘com-
mon sympathies’ found in ‘race and descent.’ Only political societies formed on this basis, 
Rawls infers from Mill, share the requisite ‘community of recollections; collective pride and 
humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past.’” JACQUELINE 
STEVENS, STATES WITHOUT NATIONS: CITIZENSHIP FOR MORTALS 33–34 (2010) (citation omit-
ted) [hereinafter STATES WITHOUT NATIONS]. 
 74. See THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 69; text accompanying note 69. 
 75. Stevens criticizes other political theorists and philosophers—Rawls, Walzer, and Raz, 
among others—for failing to see and explore the incompatibility of “ancestral paradigms of 
membership” with liberalism. See STATES WITHOUT NATIONS, supra note 73, at 31–37.  
 76. The theory of “illegal” migration as speech shares important characteristics of a “criti-
cal theory,” a mode of scholarly argument associated most prominently with the Frankfurt 
School, and that has gained traction in the legal academy via the related critical legal studies 
and critical race theory movements. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING 
EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 3d ed. 2013) (collecting canonical and 
contemporary contributions to Critical Race Theory); THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE 
CRITIQUE (David Kairys, ed., 3d. ed. 1998) (collecting seminal writings of the critical legal 
studies movement); James Bohman, Critical Theory, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Mar. 8, 
2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/critical-theory/ [https://perma.cc/9AVK-
JVD6] (“[A] critical theory provides the descriptive and normative bases for social inquiry 
aimed at decreasing domination and increasing freedom in all their forms.”). 
My central claim that “illegal” migration is speech—and moreover, a kind of speech that 
makes immigration law more legitimate than it would otherwise be—is an example of a form 
of Frankfurt School social criticism called “ideology critique.” Ideology critique “help[s] re-
veal contradictions and injustice in the reigning ideologies and worldviews of liberal democ-
racies, notably the problems of economic, legal, and ideological domination.” Froomkin, 
supra note 46, at 768 (citing JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 36–37, 142–43 
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975)). My claims also follow in critical theory’s tradition of 
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aliens to follow laws without a voice or vote, arguing that aliens “within the physical 
confines of a political community” must be granted a robust form of freedom of 
speech that impliedly includes voting rights,77 since “[n]o decision concerning 
noncitizens can be fully rational [a criterion of legal legitimacy for Habermas] if the 
decision is made on the basis of an agreement that was reached only because 
noncitizens were not given the right to participate in discourses which affect them.”78  
There is no good reason why Solum’s concern should not extend to aliens not 
present within our borders, at least with respect to immigration laws, since they are 
affected negatively by the exclusion those laws enforce.79 The negative effects of 
immigration law on aliens are robustly documented. Immigration law is a problem 
for democratic law and free speech, because immigration law demands the obedience 
of aliens without a voice or vote.80 It is a problem from a materialist perspective 
because it causes substantial and avoidable material suffering among billions of 
                                                                                                                 
 
consciousness-raising. See Bohman, supra (“[A] theory is critical to the extent that it seeks 
human ‘emancipation from slavery’, acts as a ‘liberating [. . .] influence’, and works “to create 
a world which satisfies the needs and powers” of human beings.”). The speech theory of “il-
legal” migration aims to showcase to legal scholars the constructive qualities of “illegal” mi-
gration in an effort to help scholars see the political potential and political work of un-
documented migration more clearly, and, in turn, to help steer legal reform towards the preser-
vation of those constructive elements of undocumented migration and away from the legal 
practices that silence migrants’ speech. Eventually, perhaps, some version of this theory might 
be adopted, appropriated, or critiqued by the undocumented themselves, or those who—with 
the permission of the undocumented—represent their interests.  
 77. Solum says only that aliens must be granted the “freedom of communicative action.” 
Solum, supra note 50, at 111 n.210. But “communicative action,” Habermas’s term, would 
seem to require voting rights in the sub-ideal institutional settings where Solum means his 
theory of the First Amendment to apply. This point has been clarified in Habermas’s later 
work. See Froomkin, supra note 46, at 774 (“It would be perfectly consistent with 
[Habermasian] discourse ethics . . . for a group to agree that it will decide disputed questions 
by majority vote, given the need to make decisions in real time, so long as the ‘decision[s]’” 
conform to other key procedural criteria, like being “rationally motivated.” (quoting BETWEEN 
FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 46, at 449–50)). 
 78. Solum, supra note 50, at 111  n.210.  
 79. First Amendment Scholar Timothy Zick has thoroughly considered the place of 
aliens’ interests in the First Amendment scheme. The First Amendment, Zick urges, ought to 
protect, among other things, “the right to associate with aliens at home and abroad” and “for-
eign visitors” should not be excluded on the basis of speech or association. See generally 
TIMOTHY ZICK, THE COSMOPOLITAN FIRST AMENDMENT: PROTECTING TRANSBORDER 
EXPRESSIVE LIBERTIES (2014). But Zick’s normative concerns have more to do with ensuring 
Americans’ access to global, informational, and associational interchange than the formation 
of law that is just from a global point of view. Accordingly, Zick’s theory would appear to 
accept that aliens have a right to say something about our immigration policy, but would seem 
to reject the idea that migrating “illegally” has speech content of concern to the First 
Amendment or that we should embrace the way such actions facilitate a conversation about 
the power to exclude. His theory would, I venture, imagine aliens’ contestation of autocratic 
immigration law as a process that should happen in the university seminar room, rather than 
the big tent of political protest movements.  
 80. See Abizadeh, supra note 37; supra Parts I.B & I.C. 
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humans.81 It is a problem for liberalism because restrictions on free movement of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. Economists’ best (though necessarily quite speculative) estimates of the global eco-
nomic gains that would accrue in a world of free migration hover around one hundred percent 
of global GDP. That is, global GDP would double if people could move where they wanted 
to, an increase of 77.6 trillion dollars. See LANT PRITCHETT, LET THEIR PEOPLE COME: 
BREAKING THE GRIDLOCK ON INTERNATIONAL LABOR MOBILITY 33 (2006). In 2004 U.S. dol-
lars, see Global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at Current Prices From 2004 to 2014, 
STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/268750/global-gross-domestic-product-gdp/ [https:// 
perma.cc/3E9F-X7YD]. A modest five percent increase in the labor force of developed 
countries would increase global GDP by 571 billion dollars by 2025, an amount twice that of 
Norway’s 2013 annual GDP. See DOMINIQUE VAN DER MENSBRUGGHE & DAVID ROLAND-
HOLST, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, Global Economic Prospects for 
Increasing Developing Country Migration into Developed Countries 23 (2009) (The number 
is in 2006 U.S. dollars corrected for purchasing power.); see also Norway, CIA WORLD 
FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/no.html [https:// 
perma.cc/ZB6Y-8MCY] (2013 dollars PPP) (last updated Sept. 7, 2016). While the new 
migrants allowed into rich countries would gain the most from the change, 299 billion dollars, 
the natives who sign off on an increase in migration stand to gain much as well, 190 billion 
dollars. Even more would be gained if migration to rich countries rose by eight percent. That 
scenario would yield a global increase of 874 billion dollars, 297 million for natives of rich 
countries and 577 billion dollars for migrants and their home countries. See van der 
Mensbrugghe & Roland-Holst, supra at 24–25. And the benefits to the rich countries are still 
greater than these huge numbers imply, since migrants generate taxable income in the rich 
countries that can be used for public investments that increase welfare directly, or by goosing 
the economy to make public investments that allow it to grow more quickly and robustly. With 
eight percent growth in migrants to the rich world, the tax base of rich countries would grow 
by 734 billion dollars. That these enormous economic gains can be left unrealized is a sign of 
just how rich the rich countries are. Though an eight percent increase in migration to the rich 
world would result in a significant global increase in GDP, and a radical change in wealth for 
migrants themselves, the United States would capture $145 billion of that growth or just .65% 
of projected U.S. GDP in 2019. See United States: Gross Domestic Product Based on 
Purchasing-Power-Parity Share of World Total, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org 
/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=34&pr.y=2&sy=2012&ey=2013 
&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=111&s=PPPSH&grp=0&a= [https://perma.cc 
/JM2N-8GQ4] (In PPP terms, the United States represents about 16.6% of global GDP); World 




(Projected U.S. GDP 2019). The gains are substantial for the developing world because 
migrants remit a portion of their wages to family members who remain in sending states. In 
2012, the World Bank estimated that American migrants alone sent 123 billion dollars abroad 
in remittances, an amount that exceeds the entire GDP of the Dominican Republic by 23 billion 
dollars, and is 10 billion dollars shy of New Zealand’s. See Bilateral Remittance Matrix 2012, 
THE WORLD BANK, http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDEC 
PROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:22803131~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK 
:476883,00.html [https://perma.cc/UT38-FX8Y] (This value is nominal and taken from the 
World Bank’s dataset.). In a number of developing nations, remittances amount to a substantial 
proportion of GDP. Twenty-nine percent of Nepal’s GDP consists of cash remittances and a 
number of American neighbors post numbers at or above ten percent of GDP, including 
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persons are unjustifiably illiberal.82 It is a problem for the just allocation of the 
Earth’s resources because many persons’ basic needs are not met in the places they 
are born.83 
D. Showing Epistemic Modesty About the Immigration Power by Preserving Space 
for “Illegal” Migration  
It may be that we can ultimately justify the harms that citizen-made immigration 
law causes, or arrive at reforms—short of open borders—that meet aliens’ objections 
to the current regime. But given the scope of the harms that unilateral control of 
borders cause, we owe aliens a justification for the regime more robust than the cur-
rent backstops: tradition,84 fear of the unknown, and might makes right.85 And we 
cannot formulate a more robust justification unless the power to control borders is 
breeched by aliens and we, with their input, assess the ramifications of this forced 
suspension of full control over our human composition.86 “Legal” immigrants cannot 
                                                                                                                 
 
Honduras (16.9%), El Salvador (16.4%), Jamaica (15%), and Guatemala (10%). See the World 
Bank Statistics on remittances as a percent of Nominal GDP for 2010-14, Personal 
Remittances, Received (% of GDP), THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS [https://perma.cc/TW3D-2LWT]. 
 82. See generally STATES WITHOUT NATIONS, supra note 73. 
 83. Political philosopher Matthias Risse argues that because all humans in the state of 
nature owned the earth as a collective, every person owns a share in the earth’s resources, and 
the state system as a whole has an obligation to permit all humans to cash out these shares. If 
a person is not a legal resident of a state where her basic needs are met, then she is not being 
granted her just entitlement to her share in the original ownership of the earth. Since the share 
entails a property right, the migrant in such a position, unlucky by dint of birth, may migrate 
to a parcel of the earth where her basic needs can be met. MATHIAS RISSE, ON GLOBAL JUSTICE 
89–151 (2012). 
 84. Relying on Rawls, Walzer, and other defenders of bounded democratic states, Hiroshi 
Motomura justifies his embrace of bounded democratic communities for the way they main-
tain “civic solidarity.” MOTOMURA, supra note 18, at 92. The civic solidarity argument is a 
version of defending the immigration power status quo based on tradition. This is so because 
the evidence for the importance of civic solidarity relies on past practice. Exclusive citizen 
control over borders has coincided with democratic citizens trusting each other over time, so 
it may be a necessary predicate for civic solidarity to obtain. Jacqueline Stevens has rebutted 
the solidarity argument by pointing out the ways that solidarity maintenance is compatible 
with the choose-yourself model. See STATES WITHOUT NATIONS, supra note 73, at 136–52. 
Moreover, in defending “civic solidarity” as a justification for the we-choose-you model, 
Motomura does not appear to consider that civic solidarity has not collapsed in the face of a 
large undocumented population, evidence that cuts against the necessity of the we-choose-you 
model for the maintenance of civic solidarity. In any event, my ultimate point is that the civic-
solidarity position ought to be tested in a democratic way. Doing so requires “illegal” migra-
tion under current political and legal conditions.  
 85. See STATES WITHOUT NATIONS, supra note 73, at 34–36.  
 86. This process is a very sub-ideal version of what Habermas terms “practical discourse,” 
a kind of discourse less demanding than the ideal speech situation, but which is still capable 
of creating legitimate law. Despite its serious deficits, the discourse that does occur when 
aliens migrate without permission is better than if the discourse never happened at all and 
immigration exclusion was perfectly administered. See Froomkin, supra note 46, at 773 
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adequately do this work because the citizenry chose them. Without the concrete 
knowledge from experience that “illegal” migration provides, we are just speculating 
when we say, like Rawls, that the unilateral power to control borders is necessary for 
human flourishing in societies.87 
Concededly, tradition and fear of the unknown are appropriate objections in the 
face of the demand for open borders. The unprecedented nature of having sovereign 
states relinquish their control over their human composition means that open-borders 
advocates, like Kevin Johnson,88 cannot provide decisive evidence that their theory 
is compatible with societal flourishing. Still, the status quo has an obligation to ep-
istemic modesty, too. We should be modest about the legitimacy of our immigration 
power because sovereign-controlled immigration law is such an outlier in the body 
of democratic law, and because it causes a serious degree of harm to aliens from 
many normative vantage points. 
How then to resolve this impasse of legitimacy and knowledge?89 Democratic de-
liberation and the democratic knowledge90 it produces offers a way to bridge both. 
We can know the legitimacy of borders on democratic politics’ own terms91 by, ide-
ally, requiring all persons subject to immigration law and called to respect the United 
States border to “have the opportunity . . . actually to participate in the political pro-
cesses that determine how [the immigration] power is exercised, on terms that . . . 
are consistent with their freedom and equality.”92 Doing so would produce law that 
could legitimately bind aliens and produce robust knowledge of what a border regime 
that promotes the flourishing of all humans looks like. 
Back in the real world, one way to approximate this ideal debate and gain some 
of the legitimacy and informational benefits that a true global discussion would ac-
crue is to adopt the wish list of mainstream immigration scholars. This group does 
not by and large advocate open borders,93 but rather, advocates more limited and 
                                                                                                                 
 
(“Practical discourse . . . is ‘a procedure for testing the validity of norms that are being pro-
posed and hypothetically considered for adoption.’”) (quoting Jurgen Habermas, Discourse 
Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 103 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990)).  
 87. See supra notes 73–74. 
 88. See JOHNSON, supra note 21.  
 89. First Amendment scholar Robert Post has written that the First Amendment guaran-
tees a politicized version of the enlightenment spirit of inquiry. Free speech, properly articu-
lated, allows “all possible objectives, all possible versions of national identity, be rendered 
problematic and open to inquiry.” Post, supra note 11, at 1119. Facilitating and tolerating 
“illegal” migration renders the prevailing model of autocratic control of membership norms 
and laws “problematic and open to inquiry.” Id. 
 90. See Daniel I. Morales, Immigration Reform and the Democratic Will, 16 U. PA. J.L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 49, 72 (2013) (discussing and defining “democratic knowledge” in the context 
of debates about immigration law)), republished in 34 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 123 (2014) 
(Gabriel J. Chin, ed.).  
 91. That is, without considering the voice of “all affected” by the border regime we do 
not know whether the border regime is legitimate in the way that democratic polities generally 
know what is good or right. See supra Part I.A.  
 92. In this formulation, Abizadeh borrows from Habermas. See Abizadeh, supra note 37, at 41. 
 93. See Linda Bosniak, Amnesty in Immigration: Forgetting, Forgiving, Freedom, 16 
CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 344, 355 (2013) (arguing that very few legal scholars 
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targeted efforts at immigration enforcement—including deportation—than current 
policy dictates, better due process for noncitizens, as well as the legalization of the 
undocumented population. Mainstream immigration scholars also staunchly defend 
the existing interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s birthright citizenship 
clause, which grants citizenship to the children of the undocumented.94 These modal 
views—especially the call to ratchet down the technology of immigration enforce-
ment95 and the maintenance of birthright citizenship96—in effect, advocate for poli-
cies which ensure that the ongoing, sub-ideal conversation about the immigration 
power continues and that its quality (the degree to which it approximates orthodox 
civic discourse) improves. The adoption of such reforms could also signal the per-
suasion of the citizenry by the undocumented and immigration activists.  
Mainstream reforms improve the immigration debate, I show in Part III, by lower-
ing the cost and consequences of “illegal” migrating and remaining present un-
lawfully—of protesting immigration exclusion. This leaves more room for migrants 
to migrate in protest of their exclusion and to form, over time, an immigrants’ rights 
consciousness that can articulate dissent in a more traditional form. The slogans and 
movements entitled “No One is Illegal” and #Not1More[Deportation], for example, 
are recent products of this burgeoning consciousness and exemplify the power of 
undocumented migration to spur protest movements of the traditional kind.  
“Illegal” migration also destabilizes the term “illegal alien.” By migrating without 
permission and creating lives (citizen children, homeownership) that are in-
distinguishable from the lives of aliens who migrate with permission—and even cit-
izens themselves—the undocumented raise the question whether the category of “il-
legal” migrant, and the immigration law power that makes that category, are 
necessary or useful at all.  
 These actions by migrants create a sub-ideal conversation about the immigration 
                                                                                                                 
 
have adopted the open borders position); see also STATES WITHOUT NATIONS, supra note 73, 
at 37 (explaining that scholars, like law professor Ayelet Shachar, wish to mitigate the harms 
of immigration exclusion but “want to maintain the prerogative of nation-states to exclude”).  
But see JOHNSON, supra note 21.  
 94. The call by Professors Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith to end this longstanding inter-
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment was met with immediate and forceful criticism from 
immigration scholars. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Back to Dred Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 485, 486 (1987) (reviewing PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP 
WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985)). I am aware of no 
American immigration law professor who supports eliminating birthright citizenship for the 
children of the undocumented.  
 95. See generally Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 613 (2012); Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence 
and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AMERICAN CRIM. L. REV. 105 (2012); Juliet Stumpf, The Crim-
migration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006).  
 96. Maintaining birthright citizenship for the children of the undocumented is critical to 
the maintenance of the sovereignty conversation that I am describing in this article. When this 
rule operates under conditions of undocumented migration, it converts, inter-generationally, a 
trespass of sovereignty into citizenship—the highest form of formal membership. In doing so, 
it seriously undermines the state’s sovereign right to choose members. It also becomes the 
pivot point for noncitizens connected to birthright citizen children to make the claim for their 
belonging. Birthright citizenship is a political flashpoint for precisely this reason. 
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power that treats the demands of ideal free speech theory like a lodestar—the same 
way we treat constitutional commands like the equal protection of laws. Migration 
without permission is, in this way, an act that speaks. This speech and the structures 
and reforms that enable continued protests (continued “illegal” migration and the 
conversion of those speech-acts into a traditional protest movement) partially im-
prove the legitimacy of immigration law and create conditions amenable to further 
legitimation, that is, movement towards the ideal of immigration laws constituted 
with the voice and vote of all affected by them. 
E. Conclusion  
This Part established that immigration law is less than fully legitimate due to its 
free-speech flaw, and suggested a way that “illegal” migration partially alleviates its 
illegitimacy: by sparking and maintaining a sub-ideal conversation between aliens 
and citizens about the exceptional, autocratic power to make immigration law.  
The next Part further elaborates the speech analogy by drawing comparisons to 
the unorthodox speech of subordinated groups, like African Americans and LGBTQ 
persons. The Supreme Court modified its view of free speech to capture the actions 
of these subordinated groups: our definition of constitutionally protected speech be-
came more elastic to cover their message-bearing acts. The definition of free speech 
should be at its most elastic when the question up for discussion is the immigration 
power. This is so because aliens lack direct access to the claim of alien government, 
the most basic instrument of American emancipation struggles, since they are not 
citizens, and because their speech is necessary; they are the only group that can ade-
quately raise and defend an oppositional view of the sovereign power to make immi-
gration law. Unlike canonical civil rights movements, the argument against the we-
choose-you model, or for immigrants’ rights, does not begin with the claim that 
citizens are being unjustly denied their “effective share” in democratic governance. 
The practice of democratic citizenship posits that aliens are not owed any share in 
governance at all. To make headway, then, aliens must first destabilize the 
alien/citizen binary by unlawfully seizing rights reserved for citizens and invited guests; 
only then can they begin to contest the power that excludes in more orthodox ways.  
By migrating without permission—crossing the border with the freedom a citizen 
would—migrants are contesting the alien/citizen binary in the only way that citizens 
make possible. “Illegal” migration is speech because exclusion forecloses the usual 
routes for law-legitimating dissent. 
II. “ILLEGAL” MIGRATION AS SPEECH 
Every time a migrant crosses the border without the state’s permission, or decides 
to remain resident in the United States after the expiration of a visa, that migrant 
stakes a challenge to a core aspect of sovereignty, the right of the state to determine 
unilaterally who may enter, exit, or remain in its territory and on what terms. By 
knowingly violating the state’s sovereign selection criteria, the undocumented mi-
grant necessarily declares: “I choose myself to belong to your political community.” 
In declaring this, she challenges the orthodoxy that legal and political order, and their 
fruits, depend on governments reserving this right to choose for the citizenry alone. 
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Undocumented migration contests the prevailing we-choose-you model of political 
organization and tests97 a choose-yourself substitute.98  
As one by one, crosser after crosser, visa-violator after visa-violator, make their 
lives in the United States, bear citizen children, and resist the coercive forces of the 
state that seeks to break the bonds that time, children, and other human relationships 
attach to United States territory, these millions who choose themselves to belong 
undermine the power of selection and removal that the state asserts through un-
consented laws backed by the threat of jail or deportation. Doing these things, mi-
grating “outside the law,”99 choosing yourself to belong to our political community 
is an act that speaks.100  
In this Part, I develop the descriptive and normative case for regarding un-
documented migration to the United States as political protest speech by comparing 
“illegal” migration to the atypical speech of the Civil Rights, Gay Rights, and Occupy 
movements. Through these comparisons, I show that the silent acts of crossing the 
border or overstaying a visa have speech content.101  
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. See MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 86, at 103 (dis-
cussing how political debate tests proposed definitions of the collective good).  
 98. This liberal model of political organization tracks with Joseph Raz’s “ideal of personal 
autonomy . . . [which involves] ‘the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own 
destiny,’ such that they are able to pursue their own projects and see themselves as ‘part crea-
tors of their own moral world . . . .’” Abizadeh, supra note 37, at 39 (citing JOSEPH RAZ, THE 
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 154–55 (1979)). The analogy between migrating without permission 
and protest speech is also bolstered by the fact that migrating without permission does no 
harm. See Daniel I. Morales, Crimes of Migration, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1257, 1277–89 
(2014) (showing that migration without permission does no concrete harm and that whatever 
harm inheres in such act is dispatched on deportation).  
 99. See generally MOTOMURA, supra note 18.  
 100. Speech Act theory has eroded the hard distinction between actions and speech. See, 
e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH, A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 2–3 (1997) (de-
scribing J.L. Austin’s Speech Act Theory).  
 101. Speech is an intentional act, yet the undocumented are often portrayed as mere victims 
of circumstance, rather than agentic human beings. My focus on the willfulness of un-
documented migration and my claim that these silent acts “speak” is not to deny the salience 
of the structural factors which motivate migration, like higher American wages, or poverty, or 
violence in the country of nationality. Such structural factors often motivate protest move-
ments without diminishing the agency of the protestors. Push-and-pull incentives undoubtedly 
play a principal role in the migration calculus. But the agency of migrants—their knowing 
defiance of state prerogatives—is equally undeniable. In a world where 150 million people 
say they wish to migrate to the United States, Jon Clifton, 150 Million Adults Worldwide 
Would Migrate to the U.S., GALLUP (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/153992 
/150-million-adults-worldwide-migrate.aspx [https://perma.cc/4W49-K7D6] (providing sev-
eral tables regarding migrant workers), and only a small fraction of that population has done 
so, it is incomplete to claim that those who are present without permission are simply pulled 
or pushed, like atoms ruled by the force of gravity. The population of undocumented has stood 
between eleven and twelve million people from 2007 to 2014 after climbing by nine million 
persons from 1990 to 2007. Jeffrey S. Passel, D’Vera Cohn, Jens Manuel Krogstad & Ana 
Gonzalez-Barrera, As Growth Stalls, Unauthorized Immigrant Population Becomes More 
Settled, PEWRESEARCHCENTER (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/09/03/as 
-growth-stalls-unauthorized-immigrant-population-becomes-more-settled/ [https://perma.cc 
758 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:735 
 
A. Getting Heard Under Conditions of Exclusion 
For alien government to be overcome—however imperfectly—the excluded had 
to break into the town hall to be heard. Achieving social and legal change through 
the “unforced force of the better argument”102 on its own is impossible under condi-
tions of political and legal subordination, since “an important part of a group’s sub-
ordination consists in silencing . . . .”103 And even if such groups manage to speak, 
dominant groups can wield their powers of interpretation to silence them. For exam-
ple, the dominant group may characterize whatever the subordinated says as out of 
order, or, as Kenneth Karst puts it, without reason.“[L]acking Reason, the outsider is 
unqualified for full membership in the community of equal citizens.”104 That is, 
where the powerless do not adopt the norms and premises—the language—of domi-
nant groups, their speech can be manipulated, co-opted, or suppressed by the em-
powered audience that oppresses.105 Such conditions require speech of a different 
sort, speech that is inoculated as much as possible against perversion by power. 
It helps when power also lends a helping hand. The Supreme Court’s decision to 
protect more than “reason,” more than “speech” that sounds in the town hall mode, 
helped to facilitate the Civil Rights Movement’s successes. For instance, the Court 
rejected segregationist claims that sit-ins were criminal breaches of the peace—that 
they were not “speech.” To do this doctrinally the Court translated the protesters’ 
mute actions into a “public oration delivered from a soapbox at a street corner.”106 
That strained analogy rationalized constitutional embrace; the silent action of sit-ins 
was plainly not the speech of the town hall, or a protest march—it was more potent 
than that. “The demonstrators [at sit-ins] were not just offering an opinion that they 
were entitled to equal treatment; they were . . . claiming their equal citizenship with 
                                                                                                                 
 
/W6XJ-83J3]. From 1990 to 2013, about one million people a year became legal permanent 
residents. See Legal Immigration to the United States, 1820–Present, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/Annual-Number-of-US-Legal-Permanent 
-Residents [https://perma.cc/X6H4-HBEL]. When we add the approximately four-million 
people who were deported, we get a total of twenty-nine million people who migrated to the 
United States over thirteen years, one-fifth of the 150 million who wish to migrate. See Ana 
Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. Deportations of Immigrants Reach Record 
High in 2013, PEWRESEARCHCENTER (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank 
/2014/10/02/u-s-deportations-of-immigrants-reach-record-high-in-2013/ [https://perma.cc/V7N3 
-TPC4]. The undocumented, just like those “legally” present, acted on their desire to migrate, 
while others did not; they willed themselves here and actively seek to remain; in doing so they 
speak. They speak their disapproval of the regime that excludes them.  
 102. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 46, at 306. 
 103. Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the 
Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV 95, 109 (1990); see also Langton, supra note 
40, at 293 (using Speech Act theory to describe how the subordinated can be silenced by struc-
tural conditions that prevent the empowered listener from comprehending the subordinated 
speaker’s intended meaning). 
 104. Karst, supra note 103, at 109. 
 105. See MACKINNON, supra note 40, at 193; Langton, supra note 40, at 293. See generally 
GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, A CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL REASON (1999). 
 106. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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their bodies.”107 Indeed, we might say they were seizing equal citizenship, in part by 
means of a legal breach, at least as understood in their localities at the moment that 
civil rights protesters acted. Still, these actions were utterly discursive. They bore 
messages designed to resist misinterpretation by the audience of the politically em-
powered they were meant to persuade.  
The achievements of the Gay Rights Movement would also have been impossible 
without the will of gay men and women to engage in illegal acts. At the most basic 
level, the consummation of gay sexual desire was unlawful in many jurisdictions 
until 2003.108 Had LGBTQ people followed the law, never acting on their desires, a 
gay community capable of demanding recognition and rights—a gay conscious-
ness—would never have been constituted.  
The actions of the plaintiffs in Lawrence v. Texas were the apogee of the political 
and legal power that could be mobilized by strategically challenging the criminal 
proscription of gay sex. According to a recent account,109 the Lawrence plaintiffs, on 
the strategic advice of powerful civil rights lawyers, pleaded no contest to a baseless 
sodomy charge (no one was having sex when the police entered Lawrence’s apart-
ment) in order to convert that charge into a criminal conviction they could challenge 
all the way up to the Supreme Court. This staging of gay sex110 led to the reversal of 
settled constitutional precedent, paving the way for further expansions in gay 
rights.111 
Unlike sit-ins, of course, the private gay sex criminalized in the decades prior to 
Lawrence was not labeled speech,112 but the “sex” in Lawrence nonetheless spoke, it 
defiantly rejected prohibitions on the consummation of gay sexual desire. And the 
predicate to Lawrence’s public staging of illicit gay sex was the innumerable acts of 
gay people, sexual and otherwise. These private and public acts spoke too; they qui-
etly but defiantly spoke a rejection of the state’s proscription of gay love. Without 
these acts and their eventual publication, the divergence between social norms and 
law that made Lawrence and its progeny possible could not have occurred.  
To see that mass lawbreaking was an essential and legitimate predicate to the Gay 
Rights Movement’s ultimate success, try and imagine a Gay Rights Movement with-
out lawbreaking. No one could credibly say that gay men and women should have 
sought legal change by engaging in “town hall” discourse and while remaining law 
abiding (i.e., by abstaining from sex) until the heterosexual majority was per-
suaded—by the words of gay women and men alone—that the criminalization of 
sodomy was wrong. No one could credibly say this, in part, for an epistemic reason: 
the democratic evidence for the wrongfulness of criminalization had to be adduced 
through years of gays defying the law and social norms in the quest to love and be 
treated as human on their own terms. It was only when the world failed to fall apart 
in the face of openly defiant and “illegal” gay love and family life, when the evidence 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. Karst, supra note 103, at 96. 
 108. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003). 
 109. See DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT 80 (2012). 
 110. See id. 
 111. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2585 (2015) (finding Ohio gay mar-
riage bans and refusal to recognize gay marriage in other states unconstitutional). 
 112. The ruling, of course, was anchored in the Court’s substantive due process doctrine. 
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572–75. 
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became overwhelming that homosexuality was not a pathology, that the law finally 
moved.  
“Illegal” migration has been similarly essential for challenging the sovereign 
power to exclude aliens. The decades-long presence of a massive population of un-
documented people—eleven million who chose themselves to belong to our commu-
nity—provides a significant quantum of evidence for the viability of the choose-
yourself model. Once you see that undocumented migrants are rejecting and testing 
the we-choose-you model, then the fact that our society has not collapsed under the 
weight of these breaches—of these people whom citizens did not ask for113—pro-
vides evidence for the feasibility of choose-yourself political organization. And the 
evidence is substantial. Our political system has negotiated with activist members of 
this group and bent to accommodate their self-selected membership in our local and 
national communities;114 our national identity has carried forward and adapted; our 
material and economic resources remain ample; our citizenry is mostly employed;115 
the progeny of the undocumented assimilate to the same impressive extent as their 
legal peers;116 English remains the national language and violent crime has dropped, 
especially in areas with a large population of Latino migrants.117 We could not re-
ceive and process this knowledge of our national adaptability to the choose-yourself 
model in any other way, and that is partly why we should think of “illegal” migration 
as speech.118 
 Just as homosexuality could not have been normalized and legalized without the 
open defiance of social and legal proscriptions on homosexuality, so the we-choose-
you model of political organization cannot be discredited or modified in the political 
arena without “illegal” migration.  
The willingness to break laws, and the law’s plastic accommodation—through 
                                                                                                                 
 
 113. This characterization of the citizenry’s intent only works at the level of the citizenry’s 
explicit knowledge. As Hiroshi Motomura has pointed out, immigration law by design pro-
duces an “illegal” population vastly in excess of the capacity to deport. Arguably the citizenry 
“knows” just what it is doing. See MOTOMURA supra note 18, at 106–07. See generally Gerald 
P. López, Don’t We Like Them Illegal?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1711 (2012). 
 114. See infra Part III. 
 115. For arguments on the economic pros (higher capital utilization rates, creation of new 
jobs, and dramatic increases in wages for immigrants) and cons (displacement and wage de-
creases in tradable industries) of immigration for citizens see PRITCHETT, supra note 71, at 
105–38. See also Gihoon Hong & John McLaren, Are Immigrants a Shot in the Arm for the 
Local Economy? 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21123, 2015) (find-
ing that from “1980 to 2000 . . . [e]ach immigrant creates 1.2 local jobs for local workers, most 
of them going to native workers, and 62% of these jobs are in non-traded services. Immigrants 
appear to raise local non-tradables sector wages and to attract native-born workers from else-
where in the country. Overall, it appears that local workers benefit from the arrival of more 
immigrants.”). 
 116. See PEW HISPANIC CTR., HISPANICS: A PEOPLE IN MOTION, 17–19 (Jan. 2005), 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/40.pdf [https://perma.cc/MYA9-3G9R] (discussing 
high Latino assimilation rates). 
 117. See ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING 
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 251–53 (2012). 
 118. The democratic informational benefits of free speech informs many theories of the 
First Amendment. See ZICK, supra note 79, at 13–39. 
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courts, legislation, or executive action or nonenforcement—of some of those defiant 
acts, appears central to legal change, and central to creating the conditions where the 
speech of reason can do its work. Long before the movements of recent memory, 
suffragist “Susan B. Anthony and fifty other women” “spoke” in 1872 by casting 
“ballots in an . . . election in Rochester, New York . . . .” In doing so, “they faced 
arrest, jail and conviction for the federal offense of ‘knowingly, wrongfully, and un-
lawfully voting.’”119 Reflecting on the suffragettes’ actions, Martha Minow ob-
served: “the legal system itself needs people who are willing to break the law for 
political reasons. Such people provide one of the checks on the system’s otherwise 
effective and often well-placed curbs on social change.”120 To fail to embrace these 
illegal acts as speech is to create a free speech doctrine or theory that denigrates and 
silences the subordinated—who can speak and be heard in no other way.121 
B. The Speech in the Act of Undocumented Migration 
Speaking to power requires speaking in strategic ways. African Americans, 
women, and gays had to communicate in ways that deviated substantially from the 
decorum of the town hall because of the structural conditions of their subordination. 
Yet, when considered in relation to the position of aliens who wish to migrate but are 
prevented from doing so by laws in which they had “no effective share,”122 these 
groups had two significant advantages: they were and are de jure citizens (meaning, 
among other things, that they are nondeportable) and they are already present within 
the boundaries of the political community. African Americans, LGBTQ persons, and 
women may have had to break in to the town hall, but at least they were and are 
firmly planted inside the border.  
The alien standing outside the border seeking entry faces, before anything else, 
the thick practical legitimacy of autocratic exclusion and the stunning amount of 
force deployed to vindicate it. The speech of reason, urging that the alien’s exclusion 
is illegitimate, cannot penetrate the border absent the alien’s presence. The alien can-
not effectively ask for an equal voice in the constitution of border norms and laws a 
continent away in her country of citizenship; she must choose herself and migrate in 
order to gain the standing to speak and be heard.123  
                                                                                                                 
 
 119. Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social 
Change, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 723, 734 (1991). 
 120. Id. at 741; see also Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 6, at 1097. 
 121. This is a normative theoretical claim in the critical theory tradition. See supra note 76. 
However, the speech theory does not claim to displace other theories of undocumented migra-
tion. Rather, it seeks to add to them and explain aspects of undocumented migration that are 
elided or underdeveloped in other theories. 
 122. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 59, at 3. 
 123. Moreover, any negotiation between “sending” nation states and “receiving” nation 
states on this issue would be skewed by a gross asymmetry in bargaining power that strays 
very far from the ideal conditions posited by Abizadeh or Habermas. And whatever interests 
poorer nation states may have in capturing remittance flows from wealthy states, the interstate 
system begins with the hard premise that sovereignty over people, and nearly anything else, is 
essential. “Choosing yourself” is a nonstarter in formal, sovereign to sovereign negotiations. 
762 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:735 
 
Just as the predicate to gay rights was the raising of a defiant gay consciousness 
via the commission of illegal or non-normative acts, at first surreptitiously and then 
with increasing openness; and just as the predicate to effective rights for African 
Americans was the rejection of their internal subordination, and then engagement in 
defiant strategic action meant to speak through distorting layers of power; the predi-
cate to contesting the sovereign right to exclude is illegal migration. Without “ille-
gal” migration, the question of the border’s legitimacy cannot escape the seminar 
room and be posed and contested in the political arena.   
Even if it seems implausible that aliens actually believe themselves to be migrat-
ing without permission to engage in a political project, or send a political message, 
when they do so in sufficient numbers, the undocumented form a community where 
consciousness raising can occur; their individual defiant acts give birth to the possi-
bility of migrant political action. Atomized across the world, pining for a life else-
where, the community of those who would contest the state’s right to exclude cannot 
effectively form that consciousness. Only when the inarticulate urge to move—to go 
elsewhere—is acted out, against the law of the state which the migrant enters, can 
conditions for the articulation of grievances against the we-choose-you model 
occur.124  
Indeed, we are now at the stage in this process of politicization where this oppo-
sitional message—previously spoken just through the acts of migrating and surrepti-
tiously remaining—has been made public and explicit. The “No One is Illegal”125 
and #Not1More[deportation] movements embrace the choose-yourself model, and 
the DREAMers, brought by their parents to the United States unlawfully as children, 
have begun calling their parents the “original DREAMers.”126 In doing so 
DREAMers explicitly reject the way that their parents’ guilt (for knowingly 
migrating “illegally”) has been used to construct the child-migrant DREAMers’ own 
                                                                                                                 
 
Forcing the conversation about the way that sovereignty radiates undemocratic power far be-
yond its territorial boundary—power that stunts the horizons of possibility for those who wish 
to migrate—requires that initial, knowing and defiant act of crossing the border (or overstaying 
a visa) without permission. 
 124. While immigrants with legal status can and do join in solidarity with the un-
documented, their privileged status as immigrants whom citizens chose makes it far less likely 
that noncitizens with legal status will mount a challenge to the we-choose-you model on their 
own. Of course, immigrants with formal legal status are highly likely to challenge practices 
that affect them directly, like crime-based deportation.  
 125. No One is Illegal was “[i]nitiated in Montreal in the early 2000s [and] . . . spread to 
other major cities and began engaging in aggressive campaigns against deportations.” CHRIS 
DIXON, ANOTHER POLITICS: TALKING ACROSS TODAY’S TRANSFORMATIVE MOVEMENTS 49 
(2014). #Not1More[Deportation] has translated the sentiment and consciousness of No One is 
Illegal into the U.S. context. See generally #NOT1MORE, http://www.notonemoredeportation 
.com/ [https://perma.cc/6VPR-J22R].  
 126. See, e.g., Cristina Jim, DREAMers to Congress: Don’t Mess With Us, ABC NEWS 
(June 13, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/Politics/dreamers-congress-mess-us 
-immigration-reform-opinion/story?id=19390168 [https://perma.cc/XL4U-Q4VU] (“We are 
fighting for our families, our communities, and our parents, who we know are the original 
dreamers who sacrificed so much for our futures.”); Celebrating Parents, The Original 
Dreamers, DEFINE AMERICAN: BLOG (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.defineamerican.com/blog/post 
/celebrating-parents-the-original-dreamers [https://perma.cc/Q28K-73ET]. 
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innocence.127 If the DREAMers’ parents—who, unlike their children, knowingly 
broke the law—deserve the same accommodations by the United States as the 
DREAMers themselves, then the DREAMers are asking the nation to validate the 
choose-yourself model. If the DREAMers’ parents are not illegal, then no one is.  
Echoing the logic of the “original DREAMers” and of the choose-yourself model, 
a DREAMer attending Dartmouth College explained why she was petitioning the 
college to remove “illegal alien” from its subject headings: “This term, and the way 
people used it to criminalize the choices our parents made in order to provide us with 
better lives, completely detracts from the brave choices and obstacles we overcame 
in order to survive . . . I’m not illegal. I’m a survivor that continues to work toward 
a better future.”128 
C. Presence as Speech: Occupy Wall Street and Undocumented Migration 
Compared 
For those who accept the idea that illegal action may be a predicate for the sub-
ordinated to engage in the speech of reason, but remain unpersuaded that these predi-
cates ought themselves be labeled speech, an analysis of the speech content of 
Occupy Wall Street’s “Occupation” of Zuccotti Park, Manhattan, may be instructive.  
Self-selected presence in the park during the Occupation was an essential and dis-
cursive component of the speech of the Occupy protest. The Occupiers’ nearly two-
month presence, persevering through harassment and arrests in the center of the 
world’s largest financial center, secured the Occupation’s great achievement: placing 
the question of unequal economic power on the national agenda. Three years later, 
these questions are still being digested.129 By migrating without permission and stra-
tegically acting to remain, the undocumented have similarly forced immigration law 
onto the national agenda.  
To build the analogy to “illegal” migration, consider the way presence in Zuccotti 
Park functioned during the Occupation. Under the conditions set by anarchist politi-
cal organization, stepping into the park meant immediate and substantive enfran-
chisement in the construction of the message of the Occupation.130 Protestors were 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 202 (1982) (discussing the wrongfulness of migration 
without permission alongside the innocence of minors brought to the United States at an un-
documented parent’s behest). 
 128. Jasmine Aguilera, Another Word for ‘Illegal Alien’ at the Library of Congress: 
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 130. The Occupation began on September 17, 2011. The protest was intentional and orga-
nized, but in the anarchist style. The two initiators had the goal of “getting the [Occupy Wall 
Street] meme out there,” but they did not intend to “control what happens.” This secession of 
control meant that the meme, Occupy Wall Street, would be defined and propagated by these 
self-selecting members. The initiators simply set the conditions of possibility for Occupy. 
Mattathias Schwartz, Pre-Occupied: The Origins and Future of Occupy Wall Street, NEW 
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enfranchised in two different ways. First, internally: the commitment to voice 
through the deliberative procedures of the General Assembly—the Occupation’s 
democratic organ—meant that the views of all present would be considered in nearly 
every aspect of the Occupation’s actions, from basic functional matters to the text of 
the Declaration of the Occupation (the official public statement of the protest).131 
Second, presence individually and collectively is what constituted the Occupation of 
“Wall Street.” The Occupation, quite apart from the Declaration, was the message. 
Moreover, to keep the message going, people had to continue to remain present in 
the park. Abandoning the park meant the cessation of the Occupation and a halt to 
its speech. 
And what did the Occupation say exactly? The message was really a diagnosis. 
The Occupation located Wall Street as the source of the economic malaise that mil-
lions of Americans felt in the aftermath of the world financial crisis. Presence in 
Zuccotti Park, then, was both the message itself and the means of articulating the 
malaise that motivated protestors to join the Occupation.132  
Presence in the United States without permission similarly constitutes and articu-
lates a “message.” Mass undocumented presence sets the stage for the articulation of 
a global malaise. The fertility of the United States for the contestation of the we-
choose-you model is as unique as the features of Zuccotti Park that made it fertile 
ground for the Occupation of Wall Street. Legal regimes play an important part in 
both stories. While most city parks were permitted to close at dusk, or impose cur-
fews, Zuccotti Park was privately owned, but subject to a zoning law that required 
“Zuccotti’s owner to keep the park open for ‘passive recreation’ twenty-four hours a 
day.”133 Similarly, unique legal norms make the United States fertile ground for the 
contestation of sovereignty norms that obtain globally. Federalism allows for mi-
grants to magnify their voices in sanctuary cities and states, where the choose-
yourself model has blossomed, as discussed in Part III.D.1. Birthright citizenship 
allows an “illegal” migrant to correct, in the next generation, for the injustice of her 
having been born in a country where she could not thrive. Robust protection of tra-
ditional forms of protest allows the undocumented to convert their initial act of pro-
test into a more orthodox movement for immigrants’ rights. Crossing the border into 
Zuccotti Park or the United States permits the constitution of political speech that 
would otherwise not exist or go unheard.  
As with Occupy, to continue to protest, to avoid deportation, requires remaining 
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 131. On the twelfth day of the Occupation, the General Assembly adopted a Declaration 
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present, and remaining present requires thoughtful strategic action. Occupiers, for 
their part, had to improvise logistics: how to feed, shelter, and provide sanitation for 
the occupiers. Failure to do so meant the encampment’s collapse, or eviction. Re-
maining in the United States as an undocumented person requires strategic action 
too. Moving to a state or locality with more permissive laws, hiding one’s un-
documented status, avoiding interactions with the police, and when and where pos-
sible emerging from the shadows and advocating for laws that make being “illegally” 
present easier—all these actions facilitate continued contestation of the we-choose-
you model. The undocumented cannot contest the border in the speech of reason if 
they have all been deported.  
The mixed, inconsistent, and apolitical motives of individual migrants do not de-
feat the idea that migrating without permission is a kind of speech, just as the mixed 
motives of occupiers did not defeat the unity of the message of the Occupation. In 
both cases, the parameters of joining and remaining present in a place ineluctably 
define the political speech character of that act, irrespective of motive. For example, 
I could have joined the Occupation to engage in an anthropological investigation, but 
because of the conditions of meaning set by the location of my investigation, in con-
ducting that investigation (in being present over the course of the Occupation), I 
would, by definition, be an Occupier. I would, through my presence alone, ir-
respective of intention, help constitute at least a part of the message of the 
Occupation. 
Similarly, the eleven million undocumented migrants living in the United States 
surely have innumerable apolitical motives for migrating unlawfully. But because 
the United States has clearly made their migration illegal and they have knowingly 
disregarded that legal prohibition, their act, no matter their individual motives, is 
ineluctably—in part—political speech. The content of that speech is partly defined 
by their act’s negation of the state’s power to exclude that individual. Migrating with-
out permission means “I choose myself” because the state says with force “we have 
the exclusive right to choose”134 and you were not chosen.  
As the Civil Rights protesters did, migrants present without permission are seizing 
the membership that is formally denied them. These acts are inherent challenges to 
the legal and political power that excludes. They are political acts that speak. As one 
organizer for No One is Illegal put it:  
When I think of migration patterns and how those are unfolding right 
now—even as more restrictive measures are being put in place—I think 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. Concededly, this means that the citizenry is limiting what undocumented migration 
can mean. But these limitations are the limitations of all struggles to liberate subordinated 
groups. See supra notes 103 and 105 and accompanying text. Even so, adopting an explanation 
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that the ways that people . . . are navigating these systems is amazing. 
. . . [D]espite the restrictive and dehumanizing structures that are set up, 
people find ways to fuck with them—out of necessity but also out of a 
desire to not put up with bullshit and seek a better life. People find ways 
to take down or go around all barriers. For me, these moments illustrate 
really amazing examples of resistance to the oppressive systems we live 
under.135 
If we deny the speech in these acts of resistance, we deny the voice of the subordi-
nated because we deny the political value of the only manner in which the 
subordinated can speak in the sovereignty conversation, the only way they can reg-
ister their objection to the laws that exclude them, and the only way the United States 
can internalize their critique of immigration law. Choosing to label these actions 
speech acknowledges the agency of those who choose themselves, while showing 
epistemic modesty to both sides of the open borders debate.136 
Descriptively, thinking of undocumented migration as speech accounts for the 
principal success of the undocumented: getting immigration law onto the national 
agenda. Once on the agenda, “illegal” migrants’ actions and words have prompted 
public discussion of, and reflection on, sovereignty and the categories of inclusion 
and exclusion that it creates. Just as we have been digesting Occupy Wall Street’s 
agenda-setting message, so we have been reflecting on the sovereignty problem that 
eleven million undocumented have so vividly presented. 
As with sit-ins and the Occupy movement, the immigration power discussion has 
been facilitated by the way that the mass of undocumented migrants has provoked 
the state to react—through a massive increase in deportations, perversions of tradi-
tional understandings of the separation between the civil and criminal law, and the 
triggering of local immigration enforcement actions, among other things. These re-
actions to the people who chose themselves have allowed the undocumented, and 
their allies, to expose the violence of immigration exclusion and enforcement in 
courts, agencies, and before the public. That violence has always operated, but could 
only be seen and heard once local and national governments started to get serious 
about speaking back to undocumented migrants; the persistance of the un-
documented’s “occupation” provoked this exposure of immigration law’s unseen 
violence. The millions of deportations effected through this reaction allowed the 
undocumented who remained to publicize the violence of the regime and use that 
violence to make arguments for a more cosmopolitan—a choose-yourself—sovereignty.137  
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This is not unlike the strategy of civil rights protestors, who sought to provoke 
violent reactions by the state and its officers, but trained themselves to react peace-
fully to violent state actions. Through these strategic actions, civil rights protestors 
conveyed to the American polity their victimization by Jim Crow;138 a victimization 
and violence that was always present, but never seen by those with the power to 
change it until African Americans’ defiance forced southern states to publicly and 
dramatically demonstrate that violence.  
D. Speech? Really? 
Admittedly, my argument adds up to a view of “speech” much more capacious 
than the First Amendment accommodates right now, and it is difficult to imagine the 
doctrine ever moving that much. Still, the First Amendment has bent to accommodate 
speech that is not “reason” before, and, as the decriminalization of sodomy shows, 
the First Amendment is not the only constitutional means of validating speech acts. 
Gay sex, for instance, had a discursive component similar to “illegal” migration 
while it was criminalized, and the Supreme Court eventually validated that “speech” 
sub rosa by means of an expansion of the right to privacy.139 We can acknowledge 
the speech element of certain acts with norm-changing, conversation-sparking po-
tential without vindicating them doctrinally in the First Amendment.140 
Even if First Amendment doctrine is an unlikely vehicle for the recognition of 
“illegal” aliens’ discursive contributions, it is still essential for a contemporary theory 
of “illegal” migration to see and to validate this discursive element. By labeling mi-
gration without permission speech, however unorthodox or attenuated, our theory of 
“illegal” migration can reject the layers of subordination that, for example, cause 
many citizens to label migration without permission an act of invasion, or as the state 
always labels it, an unambiguously illegal act, while acknowledging the fact that 
most of the undocumented knowingly broke immigration laws. Moreover, and unlike 
any other extant theory of “illegal” migration in the legal literature, the speech theory 
recognizes the norm-changing contributions of the undocumented, the political and 
legal work that an undocumented migrant does in the moment that she breaks the law 
by migrating without permission.141 We should privilege the speech label over other 
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labels because it acknowledges this constructive work—the way in which “illegal” 
migration is not just a problem to be solved. Doing so is also consciousness raising 
in the same way that “No One is Illegal” is. Labeling undocumented migration 
speech offers a distinct way for an alien to talk about “illegally” migrating without 
remorse and in a way that ties into robust American democratic and legal values. 
Other frames, like earned membership or forced migration, are valuable and persua-
sive too, but they have a hard time contesting an argument like, “what part of illegal 
don’t you understand?” 
But “illegal” migration and the free speech flaw in immigration law are still also 
problems to be solved, and the speech theory captures these aspects of undocumented 
migration too. The speech metaphor reflects an openness to the possibility that mi-
gration without permission is wrong, that it may be that the state ultimately can 
properly exclude people from its borders. The speech theory acknowledges this pos-
sibility without devaluing “illegal” migration. Migrants are both justified in migrat-
ing without permission, adding speech value by doing so, and also may be wrong on 
the merits. Democracies may in fact need exclusion—perhaps even autocratic exclu-
sion142—in order to survive and thrive. But, we cannot know the answer to this ques-
tion on democracy’s own epistemic terms without “illegal” migrants’ contributions 
to the democratic dialogue. The speech theory of “illegal” migration captures this 
critical and overlooked fact.  
E. What Does Deportation Say? 
Deportation also has something to say. Just as criminal law theory has imagined 
punishment as a conversation with the offender,143 deportation can be imagined in 
similar terms. Deportation says in the clearest possible way to aliens who speak by 
crossing the border: we reject your contention that you can choose yourself to belong 
to our community; you may no longer remain a part of our society; you are banished. 
Deportation is as necessary for the operation of the sub-ideal sovereignty conver-
sation as migration without permission. “Illegal” migration without deportation is 
just the full acceptance of the choose-yourself model. But the wildly disproportionate 
power of the state vis-à-vis the undocumented migrant means that the power to de-
port has to be dramatically tamed in order for even the roughest approximation of a 
political conversation to occur. The simultaneous necessity of deportation and the 
need to check deportation in order to facilitate the sovereignty conversation is an-
other way of accounting for the seeming paradox that many legal scholars suggest or 
imply some legitimate scope for deportation, yet nearly every contribution to the 
literature critiques any effort by the state to make deportation a more regular, less 
expensive occurrence.144 Though the violence of deportation may be minimally 
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. If it turns out society collapses, or moves significantly towards collapse, under the 
weight of undocumented migration, then the we-choose-you model, or something in between, 
would be vindicated. 
 143. See R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 53, 191–93 (2007). 
 144. David Martin is one of a few immigration scholars who pointedly emphasizes how 
immigration enforcement is normatively desirable. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 26. 
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justifiable145 on the grounds of epistemic modesty, the rest of the coercive apparatus 
is more problematic. Curtailing as much as possible these nondeportation forms of 
legal violence, like immigration detention146 for example, appropriately lowers the 
toll the United States’ imposes on aliens’ dissent. 
F. Conclusion 
The immigration law literature mostly accepts that deportation and migration re-
striction are legal, but also urges that migrating without permission is not exactly 
wrong. Framing “illegal” migration as, in part, an act of protest rationalizes scholars’ 
intuitions and arguments in a way that ennobles migrants rather than victimizes them. 
It rejects the idea that “illegal” migration is criminal, the treason of the global order, 
but remains open to the possibility that migrants may be mistaken in their view that 
“sovereignty” should bend to the choose-yourself model they advocate by migrating. 
In short, the speech theory allows for two things: (1) that undocumented protestors 
are not wrong for protesting—migrating without permission—and (2) that they may 
be wrong about the answer to the question that their actions pose. The speech theory 
holds that migrants may not have the right to migrate without permission, but do 
have the right to question the we-choose-you model—by migrating without 
permission. 
In the legal literature the impulse is usually to portray undocumented migration 
as a regulatory failure that creates numerous victims and that ought to be solved. The 
aspiration is to have immigration regulation without the “illegal.” By illustrating the 
productive quality of undocumented migration—it forces a conversation about an 
otherwise uncritical deployment of state-sanctioned violence—I mean to focus 
scholars on what we have gained for migrants’ efforts.  
Another thing immigration advocates gain by recognizing “illegal” migration as 
speech is a new way of engaging in a dialogue with opponents of “illegal” migration. 
The speech theory offers a new response to citizens who object to “illegal” migration 
as simple lawbreaking. Now we can say the following:  
Yes, migrants are breaking the law by migrating without permission, but note that 
border laws are very different than other laws. Those who migrate illegally, as you 
say, never asked to be born in their home countries and were never asked to partici-
pate in the formation of the immigration laws that directly restrict them—not us. You 
might be right that we can legitimately exclude or deport them nonetheless, but you 
must at least remain open to the possibility that we might be wrong to do so. In any 
case, we will never really consider the issue democratically unless some people put 
our border laws to the test. “Illegally” migrating leads to conditions where we can 
actually have a debate about immigration law and policy that takes into account the 
views of those who are most affected by those laws. This is the only way that we 
allow aliens to have a voice in the formation of these laws—which again, apply only 
to them. So, yes, aliens are willfully breaking our laws, but those laws are ours, not 
theirs. It seems right to have a real discussion about such an important issue, and we 
                                                                                                                 
 
 145. See Morales, supra note 98, at 1314–24. 
 146. See generally César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Abolishing Immigration Prisons, 
97 B.U. L. REV. 245 (2017).  
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just can’t have that discussion under current conditions unless migrants voice their 
views. Unfortunately, the only way that we’ve left them to do that is by allowing for 
“illegal” migration.  
Note how this account neither fully approves nor fully disapproves of migrating 
without permission. It neither says that migrating without permission is a “legal” act 
in the sense of the “No One is Illegal” organizer nor does it concede that the act is 
illegal—criminal—in the sense meant by the objector. Still, it meets head on the ob-
jector’s view of the fact of illegal migration. Instead of painting the migrant as the 
victim of push-and-pull factors, it concedes the willfulness of a migrants’ “illegal” 
migration, but offers reasons, not “to forgive, or forget”147 an “illegal” migrant’s 
speech, but to question the moral and legal foundation of the law that made that mi-
grant’s act illegal in the first place, and to question the necessity of such laws.  
III. THE PERSUASIVE FORCE OF THE UNDOCUMENTED 
The speech of the undocumented has been persuasive. The we-choose-you model 
has accommodated the decision of the undocumented to choose themselves to a sig-
nificant extent. This fact, the persuasive force of the undocumented, is often lost in 
the literature’s emphasis on the citizenry’s expanded and increasingly punitive “an-
swer” to migrant’s protests, like the dramatic escalation in deportations, expansion 
of immigration detention, or the militarization of the United States southern border.  
Yet, the undocumented and their “speech” have persisted and persuaded, despite 
the citizenry’s violent answer to their protests. The population of undocumented—
eleven million—has barely budged from its peak. Previously deported migrants con-
tinue to return, and aliens with no prior history in the United States continue to 
choose themselves for membership in protest of their exclusion.  
And these quiet forms of protest speech have increasingly been translated by mi-
grants into the “speech of reason” to significant success. When local governments 
grant undocumented migrants driver’s licenses and pay for their kidney trans-
plants,148 when President Obama grants a temporary reprieve from immigration pros-
ecution to millions of undocumented people, migrants who chose themselves gain 
indicia of membership—of citizenship or legal belonging—from local and national 
governments. These concessions mean the choose-yourself model has had persuasive 
force. Migrants are persuading some groups of citizens, and some key political ac-
tors, through a sub-ideal version of “the unforced force of the better argument.” 
Moreover, some of these policies, like President Obama’s executive actions, have 
structural effects that fortify migrants’ ability to contest the we-choose-you model 
into the future.  
This Part illustrates some ways in which the United States has been persuaded to 
partially adopt the choose-yourself model and how undocumented migrants have 
forced that shift. Absent the willful acts of undocumented migrants, our sovereign 
power to choose members would not have been challenged or renegotiated.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 147. See Bosniak, supra note 22, at 347–48. 
 148. Meredith Rodriguez, Immigrants in State Illegally To Get State-Funded Kidney 
Transplants, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 29, 2014, 5:26 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct 
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A. Evidence of “Illegal” Migration’s Persuasive Force 
The persuasive force of “illegal” migration reveals itself when we evaluate legal 
and political developments for how they support or undermine our power to pick and 
choose migrants. Under this rubric, the shift towards the choose-yourself model and 
the role of undocumented migrants in securing that shift becomes clear. 
Let us begin by acknowledging that the logic of sovereignty over aliens makes 
access to any and all goods under the control of the state subject to the state’s consent. 
And the state reserves, through sovereignty, the right to pick and choose who ac-
cesses those goods—territory, education, medical care, etc. Accordingly, every legal 
accommodation to the undocumented population represents a shift, however small 
or contingent, in sovereignty norms, since people who chose themselves to be part 
of our community—people whom we explicitly excluded through law—are granted 
access to rights and privileges that the logic of sovereignty says we may reserve only 
for the invited.  
Not only does the substance of accommodation signal a shift in sovereignty 
norms, but the unprecedented means by which those accommodations are granted by 
government show just how anti-we-choose-you these actions are. Bending numerous 
traditional methods of governing to accommodate a class of people who—in viola-
tion of our sovereignty—have chosen themselves to belong to our community sets a 
structural political and quasi-legal precedent for similar or more expansive anti-
sovereign shifts in the future. Obama’s recent executive actions on immigration are 
a significant example of this phenomenon.  
B. The Persuasion of President Obama 
President Obama is now one of the persuaded.149 His recent executive actions 
make it easier to choose-yourself for membership in the political community. In his 
speech introducing these new policies, President Obama indicated approval of the 
choose yourself model and made an effort to persuade all Americans of its viability: 
My fellow Americans, we are and always will be a nation of immigrants. 
We were strangers once too. And whether our forebears were strangers 
who crossed the Atlantic or the Pacific or the Rio Grande, we are here 
only because this country welcomed them in and taught them that to be 
an American is about something more than what we look like or what 
our last names are or how we worship. What makes us Americans is our 
shared commitment to an ideal – that all of us are created equal and all 
of us have the chance to make of our lives what we will.150 
                                                                                                                 
 
 149. Prior to his executive actions, President Obama was frequently portrayed by immi-
gration activists as the “deporter-in-chief.” Barack Obama, Deporter-In-Chief, ECONOMIST 
(Feb. 8, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21595902-expelling-record-
numbers-immigrants-costly-way-make-america-less-dynamic-barack-obama 
[https://perma.cc/5H62-EJAE]. 
 150. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform (Nov. 
20, 2014), in 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOCS. No. 201400877, Nov. 2014, at 4.  
772 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:735 
 
“What makes us Americans is . . . the chance to make of our lives what we will” 
—a more elevating endorsement of those who choose themselves, I cannot imagine. 
It is the undocumented, after all, who contested their exclusion—declaring that not 
even the sovereignty of the world’s most powerful nation would keep them from 
making what they would of their lives. In this formulation, those who chose them-
selves are the most American of all because they risked everything—and continue to 
do so—without any assurances, just for a chance at the American dream for them-
selves or their children. 
President Obama’s rhetoric and executive actions are particularly significant for 
a speech theory of “illegal” migration because they are evidence of “illegal” migra-
tion’s persuasive force. The President’s position evolved over time and in response 
to his experience enforcing immigration laws, cajoling Congress to act, and interact-
ing with migrant activists.  
While Obama has long championed a pathway to citizenship for the un-
documented, he also escalated significantly the volume of deportations over his years 
in office in a bid to signal enforcement seriousness to the Congress that would need 
to sign off on normalizing the status of the undocumented. This play did not work. 
Congress failed to pass a bill normalizing the status of the undocumented and the 
human suffering caused by telegraphing enforcement seriousness with deportation—
broken families, stunted horizons—became undeniable. In the face of this evidence, 
President Obama changed course; his executive actions meaningfully rationalize and 
deescalate immigration enforcement and attempted to quasi-legalize millions of un-
documented—all on the President’s own authority.  
In the rest of this Part, I will show how Obama’s executive actions are evidence 
of the partial but significant extent to which “illegal” migration, and the activism it 
spurred, has persuaded the President to support the choose-yourself model.151  
1. What Are Obama’s Executive Actions? 
After years of seeking a legislative solution to our “broken immigration sys-
tem,”152 President Obama changed course on November 20, 2014, issuing a series of 
legal memoranda153 that alter the means, strategy, and substance of immigration 
regulation in the United States. 
The Administration issued ten memos in all and claims that the memoranda 
achieve, respectively, the following goals: (1) strengthen border security; (2) revise 
removal priorities; (3) end Secure Communities and replace it with new priority en-
forcement program; (4) personnel reform for Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
officers; (5) expand deferred action for childhood arrivals; (6) extend deferred action 
                                                                                                                 
 
 151. My aim here is not definitively to prove causation, but rather to show how migrants who 
migrated “illegally” can plausibly claim credit for the President’s shift. Other accounts can then 
seek to falsify or nuance mine. See, e.g., STATES WITHOUT NATIONS, supra note 73, at 225.  
 152. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Fact Sheet: Fixing our Broken 
Immigration System so Everyone Plays by the Rules (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.whitehouse 
.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/29/fact-sheet-fixing-our-broken-immigration-system-so-everyone 
-plays-rules [https://perma.cc/L4NN-2ZME]. 
 153. All the Memoranda are publicly available at DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-action [https://perma.cc/R5SS-WE87]. 
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to parents of Americans and lawful permanent residents; (7) expand provisional 
waivers to spouses and children of lawful permanent residents; (8) revise parole 
rules; (9) promote the naturalization process; (10) support high-skilled businesses 
and workers. The bulk of these, as I will show, fortify the choose-yourself model. 
The first priority, strengthen border security, hews to the border-enforcement-first 
formulation of past legislative grants of legal status, but the increased enforcement 
measures at the geographical border are outweighed by the moves to roll back some 
of the technologies—like Secure Communities—which facilitated a massive in-
crease in deportation demand and capacity. On balance, then, these actions represent 
a choose-yourself shift in sovereignty norms; they make life better for those who 
chose themselves.  
C. Deferred Action Vindicates the Choose-Yourself Model 
Obama’s executive actions vindicate the choose-yourself model.154 Most clearly, 
the promise of a reprieve from deportation155 directly and substantially benefits the 
undocumented people who chose themselves to become part of our political commu-
nity. The reprieve from deportation offers both a substantive and a procedural bene-
fit. Substantively, it offers protection from deportation and the psychological comfort 
of a period certain during which the migrant will not have to live with the threat of 
exile. This is a repose that the we-choose-you model does not permit—there is no 
statute of limitations for immigration law violations.156  
Procedurally, these expansions of deferred action do a few things. They further 
root—and with a legal imprimatur157—the five million beneficiaries in the United 
States by buying them more time in the country. This legalized rooting is significant 
                                                                                                                 
 
 154. See Zoltan L. Hajnal, The Democrats’ Immigration Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 
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AMERICA 60 (2004).  
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because “time and ties”158 to the United States are arguments with significant traction 
in political debates about migration and in the immigration statute itself.159 Accord-
ingly, even though a new Administration has the right to undo the promise not to 
deport, or fail to extend the length of the reprieve (should Congress continue to defer 
legislative action), the logic of “time and ties” will at least guarantee that any un-
winding of these benefits by a subsequent administration will be viewed as a more 
violent and inhumane shift than would have been the case had the status quo of im-
migration inaction continued. This gives undocumented migrant activists and their 
allies a stronger foothold from which to protest any rollback.  
Obama’s memoranda shifted the burden of persuasion to opponents of legaliza-
tion and undocumented migration by fortifying existing arguments for legal status 
for those who choose themselves and added a new argument: that the leader of the 
free world believed granting some form of legal status to a large swath of the un-
documented was important enough to risk a major backlash.160 These moves all sup-
port the choose-yourself model.  
Additionally, just as the decisions of prior presidents to shield large groups of 
aliens from deportation provided legal ballast for Obama’s current move, Obama’s 
actions set a new precedent that future groups of undocumented may use to assert 
their interests. And the unprecedented scope of Obama’s order161 means that he cre-
ated another, stronger, “weapon of the weak”162 than existed previously. 
An equally divided Supreme Court upheld without opinion an injunction barring 
this reprieve from deportation, but the lower court opinion has been widely criticized 
as erroneous. While the decision was a blow to a signature piece of President 
Obama’s executive actions,163 the precedent of presidential action will nonetheless 
lie in wait to be mobilized by other groups of aliens at a strategic moment in the 
future, especially if a majority of democratic appointees emerges on the court. What-
ever happens, Obama’s expansion of deferred action marks “illegal” migration’s per-
suasive force, if not its current legal efficacy.  
D. Defined Enforcement Criteria Fortifies the Choose-Yourself Model 
The expansion of deferred action has been the most controversial of President 
Obama’s executive actions because it is the most legible way that Obama rejected 
the sanctity of the we-choose-you model. Yet the Administration’s changes in de-
portation enforcement practices also vindicate the choose-yourself membership 
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model and, unlike deferred action, these changes were not challenged in court.164 
With these memoranda, the persuasive force of undocumented migrants is now law 
in practice.  
 The shift to firm definite criteria for crime-based deportation from a system that 
engaged in a significant amount of untargeted enforcement creates another weapon 
of the weak by carving out a kind of safe harbor for those who manage to cross the 
border or overstay their visas. With definite enforcement criteria in place, a migrant 
can conform her behavior to the executive’s written priorities and have some assur-
ance that the state will respect, in a limited way, the migrant’s choice to become a 
member.  
To appreciate the import of this change, consider the efficiency benefits of ran-
dom enforcement in a world of scarce resources. Randomness multiplies every act 
of enforcement by projecting to others engaged in the same unlawful behavior that 
they could be next. If the enforcement target is unpredictable, then it will be difficult 
for violators to ensure that they will not be targets of enforcement except by ceasing 
the targeted illegal behavior. In this way, untargeted enforcement multiplies the de-
terrent effects of an instance of law enforcement—at least when no other counter-
vailing factors are considered. 
In practice, of course, the behavioral calculus is much more complicated. In the 
case of undocumented migrants, untargeted enforcement on its own is likely in-
sufficient to persuade masses of undocumented to “self-deport,”165 since the reasons 
for remaining (family, higher wages, debts to smugglers, promises to send remit-
tances home) in most cases swamp the negative psychological effects of untargeted 
enforcement, and the risk of actually being deported (which remains low since the 
amount of deportations that may be effected in a given year is a small percentage of 
the undocumented population). Still, even if untargeted enforcement doesn’t “work” 
in this case, it imposes psychological suffering on migrants who chose themselves 
for choosing themselves; by doing so, it operates as a psychological punishment di-
rected at all undocumented people because they violated our sovereignty.166  
With this background, a shift away from untargeted enforcement to defined crite-
ria is choose-yourself friendly in a few ways. First, doing so implicitly acknowledges 
that the imposition of a psychological punishment incapable of actually correcting 
the sovereign violation—that is, forcing the migrant to leave—is gratuitous. A re-
tributive logic—one which viewed the sovereign violation as morally wrong—would 
instead approve of the psychological toll of untargeted enforcement because it would 
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help to make the wrongness of that act real for the migrant who chose herself.167 
Imposing this quasi-punishment makes the we-choose-you model real even as the 
migrant violates it through her presence.  
 Second, setting out and actually holding to168 definite criteria for enforcement 
means that a migrant can conform her behavior to those criteria and have some as-
surance that her decision to choose herself for admission will be respected by the 
state. For example, convicted felons are one of the highest priorities for deporta-
tion.169 By avoiding felonious conduct and multiple misdemeanor offenses, along 
with the other avoidable behaviors cataloged in other parts of the memorandum, the 
migrant can have some significant degree of assurance that he will not face deporta-
tion.170 Moreover, during the time that a migrant conforms his behavior to these cri-
teria, he builds further “time and ties” to the United States and thus increasingly 
qualifies for the exercise of favorable discretion by immigration enforcement agen-
cies.171 When coupled with the changes Obama made to make these written criteria 
real in practice,172 the new policies mean that if you have selected yourself to become 
part of our community we have set out a legal framework for you to follow in order 
to avoid deportation. 
These changes, considered cumulatively, constitute a very limited alien-directed 
de facto deferred action, achieving similar—though far from identical—results for 
those who conform strictly to the criteria. The clearest difference is that those granted 
deferred action have been given an explicit promise. Another difference is that those 
who create de facto deferred action for themselves will not receive authorization to 
work legally, and many of the ways in which the undocumented seek work (using 
false documents to prove legal eligibility to work, for example) can leave them 
criminally liable in a way that would render them a deportation priority.173  
Even here, however, the difference in practice will depend on how the agencies 
administer and interpret the normative thrust of Obama’s reorientation of 
immigration enforcement practices. Obama’s speech introducing the American 
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public to his directives was notable for framing undocumented peoples’ work as an 
indicia of membership rather than one of wrongdoing—stealing jobs. “Over the past 
years, I have seen the determination of immigrant fathers who worked two or three 
jobs without taking a dime from the government and at risk any moment of losing it 
all, just to build a better life for their kids.”174 Obama acknowledges that Americans 
worry about “job theft,” but he emphasizes what economists have emphasized 
—migration is good for the American economy as a whole.175  
I know some worry, immigration will change the very fabric of who we 
are or take our jobs or stick it to middle class families at a time when 
they already feel like they’ve gotten the raw deal for over a decade. I hear 
those concerns. But that’s not what these steps would do. Our history and 
the facts show that immigrants are a net plus for our economy and our 
society.176  
If this rhetoric is translated into policy, it means that enforcement of prohibitions 
on employing undocumented people, and prosecution of the undocumented who gain 
employment through false documents, will be deemphasized, with the downstream 
effect that fewer migrants will be deported for committing those crimes.177 
Even absent a shift away from employer enforcement, the undocumented will still 
retain access to the growing number of jobs that make up the informal or “gray” 
economy178—where much undocumented work already happens. Undocumented mi-
grants who tread carefully can thus carve out a semi-stable, if stunted, de facto de-
ferred action without actually qualifying for that status.179  
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1. Choose-Yourself Enforcement Federalism 
The memorandum modifying the much-maligned “Secure Communities” pro-
gram is perhaps the most significant shift in support of the choose-yourself model, 
and it happened as a result of the defiance of national prerogatives by local commu-
nities—such as Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York—with large 
undocumented populations. In these jurisdictions, migrants used the speech of reason 
to persuade local officials to adopt positions that resisted the national government’s 
efforts to conscript local law enforcement resources in service of national immigra-
tion enforcement efforts. The memorandum overturning this force-multiplying fed-
eral enforcement program illustrates how the local speech of the undocumented can 
have national effects.  
a. What Was the Secure Communities Program?  
 Secure Communities was an innovation of the Bush (G.W.) Administration and 
was carried forward and expanded by the Obama Administration. For many years, 
state and local law enforcement have forwarded fingerprint data to the FBI. Under 
Secure Communities, that information would be forwarded on to DHS, where it 
would be checked against DHS’s database of 140 million individuals, including visa 
applicants, travelers whose fingerprints are scanned at ports of entry, and immigrants 
who have violated immigration laws. Where there was a match between the two da-
tabases, ICE “review[ed] a series of databases in an attempt to ascertain the individ-
ual’s immigration status and criminal history.”180 If this review suggested that the 
alien may be deportable, ICE notified “the originating law enforcement agency and 
the relevant ICE field office, which decides, based on enforcement priorities and 
other factors, whether to interview the individual or issue a detainer requesting that 
the agency hold the individual”181 so that DHS could take custody. ICE would often 
take custody of the migrant while the person was out on bond, and localities knew this.  
In this way, contact with local law enforcement—just an arrest—triggered federal 
review for deportability, amplifying significantly DHS’s ability to know aliens’ 
whereabouts and activities and deport them based on that knowledge. The program’s 
reliance on arrests to trigger deportation review meant that the “discretion that 
matter[ed]”182 was the arresting officer’s choice to arrest. Because ICE has limited 
tools to impose backend discretion not to deport a migrant that is within the agency’s 
sights, an arresting officer’s choice triggered an information cascade that usually re-
sulted in deportation. Absent the arrest, the migrant remained one of the tens of mil-
lions of aliens, undocumented or not, that were off of DHS’s radar. The automaticity 
of deportation following an arrest also gave local arresting officers the effective 
power to control whom in their jurisdictions was deported. In numerous jurisdictions, 
officers arrested people for pretextual crimes that would facilitate booking, allowing 
the officer to flip the switch on the information cascade and produce a deportation.  
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b. Local Resistance Becomes Federal Policy  
A number of municipalities found this program so abhorrent to local immigration 
and community policing values that they refused to cooperate with ICE, refusing to 
honor ICE requests to detain migrants after their release from criminal custody. The 
Johnson memo largely consolidates the non-cooperating jurisdictions position in fed-
eral policy. Communities on the right of immigration issues will have their power to 
dictate immigration restrictionist aims curtailed in a few ways. First, arrest alone will 
be less likely to trigger the deportation cascade. The memo specifies that ICE should 
seek to take custody of an alien flagged as a “match”183 by ICE’s database where that 
alien has been convicted of crimes specifically enumerated in the memorandum set-
ting out new priorities “for the [a]pprehension, [d]etention and [r]emoval of 
[u]ndocumented [i]mmigrants.”184 Those crimes include felonies “other than a state 
or local offense for which an essential element was the alien’s immigration status,” 
or “three or more misdemeanor offenses, other than minor traffic offenses or state or 
local offenses for which an essential element was the alien’s immigration status.”185  
The basic shift to convictions from arrests increases the cost to municipalities who 
wish to game federal immigration priorities. The further narrowing of federal immi-
gration interest to felony prosecutions and multiple misdemeanors—and excluding 
minor traffic offenses—increases the costs of localities wishing to pursue their “own 
[restrictionist] immigration policy”186 even further. Since mere contact with the 
criminal justice system will not suffice to effect a deportation, the wheels of criminal 
justice will actually have to turn in order for a locality to achieve the deportation it 
seeks. As a single misdemeanor arrest or conviction will no longer suffice, a munici-
pality determined to effect its own immigration priorities will have to triple its mis-
demeanor arrest rate among local populations with a higher probability of being im-
migration law violators.187 The same is true for felonies.  
The memo also changes which institutional actors can pursue sub rosa immigra-
tion enforcement. Now prosecutors will play a more significant gatekeeping role. 
While there are certainly some municipalities willing to absorb the increased costs 
of affecting a local deportation policy, the numbers will be significantly lowered by 
this change. The exclusion of minor traffic crimes makes things still more difficult, 
since this was a primary way that police funneled migrants into the deportation 
system.  
Moreover, by deprioritizing deportation of aliens convicted of a “state or local 
offense for which an essential element was the alien’s immigration status”188 the 
memorandum cuts off yet another method states had deployed to further their own 
restrictionist deportation policy: the passage of criminal laws specifically aimed at 
migrants. As local interest in immigration regulation escalated, a number of states, 
including Arizona and Alabama, turned to the criminal law as a method of penalizing 
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undocumented migrants, and securing their deportation, either to their countries of 
origin, or to states and localities more hospitable to migrants.  
Many of these criminal laws were struck down as a conflict or obstacle preempted 
by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States.189 But some survived judicial scru-
tiny and remain on the books. For instance, an Alabama law prohibits “unlawfully 
present aliens from entering, or attempting to enter, into a ‘public records transaction’ 
with the state or a political subdivision thereof.”190 Violators face up to ten years 
imprisonment, and leave prison convicted felons. The new memorandum will not 
prioritize deportation of migrants convicted of felony crimes like this one, since un-
lawful presence is an element of the crime. The Obama Administration has thus nul-
lified the immigration consequences of these criminal laws, even though it was not 
able to achieve preemption in court.191 
Still, the exemption for state laws targeting aliens does leave room for continued 
state control. For example, in Missouri, a person may be charged with a felony on 
her third misdemeanor conviction for driving without a license.192 The statute applies 
to all persons within Missouri’s jurisdiction—alienage is not an element of the crime. 
But, because Missouri unlike a few other states will not confer driver’s licenses on 
undocumented residents, an undocumented person who drives without a license is 
not showing any disregard for licensing laws, but rather driving out of perceived 
necessity (for employment, for example) in a context where the state refuses to confer 
that privilege on him, no matter what his qualifications to drive, because the alien 
does not have legal status. In this way, as applied to undocumented people, a seem-
ingly neutral and natural exercise of Missouri’s police power can, with federal co-
operation, turn into an instrument of immigration regulation.  
There is room to interpret the memorandum in a way that would exclude such 
crimes as deportation priorities. But whether DHS formally adopts expanded lan-
guage, the thrust of the memoranda, and the reasons for their adoption (immigration 
advocacy), suggest that in practice criminal convictions resulting from disabilities 
imposed by undocumented alienage will be deprioritized. The choice to exempt 
crimes where alienage is an element reflects a preference for nationally uniform de-
portation priorities. The exception defangs existing state crimes turning on alienage, 
and thereby disincentivizes the creation of more state crimes that turn on alienage. 
The result is that this category of crimes will not be respected by ICE as reliable 
proxies of undesirability for membership.  
The Obama Administration’s reform of how it uses information gleaned from lo-
cal arrests and prosecutions is a pro choose-yourself shift. By adopting regulatory 
positions that consolidate the policies of the more choose-yourself friendly immigra-
tion localities, and by embracing a form of choose-yourself rhetoric, the Obama 
Administration is further catalyzing local choose-yourself reforms. By dampening 
the deportation effects of local laws and practices with restrictionist aims, Obama is 
disincentivizing local efforts to defend the we-choose-you model. 
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CONCLUSION 
If undocumented migrants have persuaded us to adopt choose-yourself shifts in 
sovereignty norms, they have also fortified the we-choose-you model in the most 
literal sense: the fence—virtual and physical—that spans thousands of miles of our 
southern border is the most durable reaction to migrants’ protest against the we-
choose-you model.193 Obama’s executive actions, and his actions earlier in the 
Administration, have not altered this dynamic; they have reflected and amplified it. 
Additionally, we might see the continued failure of Congress to enact a pathway to 
citizenship for the millions of undocumented, the rise of Donald Trump, and, indeed, 
the failure of Obama’s executive actions explicitly to protect the entire group of un-
documented people as signals that sovereignty norms have in fact moved in the other 
direction. After all, in 1986, a democratic congress passed—and Reagan signed 
—comprehensive immigration reform legislation that ultimately regularized 2.7 
million undocumented people. If executive action is all that migrants’ work has 
yielded today, have sovereignty norms really shifted in a cosmopolitan direction? 
Even if they have shifted, how durable is that shift, given the vehement 
congressional,194 judicial,195 and political backlash? Can the conversation over the 
autocratic power to exclude continue in the face of this harder border?  
Linda Bosniak described America’s attitude towards undocumented migrants as 
“hard on the outside, soft on the inside.”196 Post Obama’s executive actions, the out-
side is harder and the inside is softer for all the reason I’ve discussed in my prior 
analysis. Indeed, if we read Bosniak’s metaphor back onto the dawn of numerical 
immigration restriction and the first attempts to calcify the southern border, we can 
locate the beginnings of this seemingly contradictory state of affairs in the 1920s.197  
Placing Obama’s actions in this broader historical frame shows how the political 
work of undocumented migrants has been persistent and slow burning. And while 
the hot-blooded backlashes by citizens have come just as regularly, the norm-
changing work the undocumented have catalyzed has continued. It may be un-
imaginable today that we might “open the floodgates”198 and explicitly allow any 
human being to choose themselves to belong to our community, but it was equally 
unimaginable that the neo-city-states of New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and 
Chicago, would explicitly declare themselves sanctuary cities—temples of the 
choose-yourself model. Now it seems unimaginable that these localities would re-
verse course and join the Arizonas, citadels of we-choose-you. This history of 
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sovereign contestation by the undocumented is more durable than this Congress, this 
Supreme Court, or even Donald Trump. 
Moreover, there is a gaping hole in the hard exterior that will be difficult to close. 
Though the term “undocumented migrant” always conjures people crossing the Rio 
Grande, forty-percent of migrants are visa overstayers.199 And while the DHS has 
dramatically improved its capacity to know whether people actually exit the country 
after they arrive, calcifying the soft inside will face many more legal barriers than 
building Trump’s wall. The post-September eleventh period, which led to the effec-
tive curtailment of student and travel visas, has subsided, and while terrorism con-
tinues to inspire fear, there are few serious calls for restrictions on those modes of 
entry. Thus, as the exterior gets harder, the face of those who contest sovereignty 
norms may begin to shift, but the contest is likely to continue.  
The sovereignty calcifying reactions to undocumented migration, real and harsh 
as they are, are thus better read as efforts by the state to signify paper sovereignty’s 
reality; they are not a reflection of the we-choose-you model’s strength, but of its 
increasing weakness. Though the citizenry is not now persuaded of the choose-
yourself model’s viability, we ought to start recognizing the growing evidence in its 
favor, and credit undocumented migrants for forcing these shifts; they have done 
more than anyone else to give the choose-yourself model—open borders—life. 
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